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UNITED STATES v. PHILADELPHIA NATIONAL BANK:
THE APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 7 OF THE
CLAYTON ACT TO BANK MERGERS
In United States v. Philadelphia National Bank,1 the Supreme Court of
the United States held that statutory bank mergers2 fall within the spectrum
of section 7 of the Clayton Act.3 It was further held that a merger 4 which
tends to substantially lessen competition is in violation of section 7, because
competition is the sole criterion to be considered. 5 This case is noteworthy
because section 7 of the Clayton Act had never before been directly applied
to commercial banking. 6 Bank mergers had previously been governed solely
by the federal legislation specifically designed for the banking industry. 7 Under
the standards thus set forth competition was not the sole criterion; that was
one consideration along with others that were also important.8 It is the purpose
of this Case Note to analyze the Court's reasons for its application of section
7 to bank mergers, and to consider the implications of the decision 9 with
emphasis on the manner in which mergers were controlled prior to the
1. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
2. 73 Stat. 460 (1959), 12 U.S.C. § 215 (Supp. IV, 1963); Bank Merger Act, 74
Stat. 129 (1960), 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (Supp. IV, 1963).
3. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
4. Technically the principal case involved a "consolidation," but due to its essential
likeness to a merger the terms can be used interchangeably.
5. For the Court's appraisal of the impact of the merger on competition, see 374
U.S. at 355-72.
6. Id. at 324. One case prior to 1960 dealt with antitrust against banks. United States
v. Firstamerica Corp., Civil No. 38139, N.D. Cal., March 30, 1959. However, this was a
Sherman Act suit brought against a bank holding company which was settled by consent
decree.
Section 7 of the Clayton Act was applied to banking in Transamerica Corp. v. Board
of Governors, 206 F.2d 163 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 901 (1953), but this suit also
was against a bank holding company.
7. See H.R. REP. No. 1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-11, 13 (1960) ; S. REP. No. 196,
86th Cong., 1st Sess. 21-22 (1959).
8. The factors set forth in the statute are:
the financial history and condition of each of the banks involved, the adequacy of
its capital structure, its future earnings prospects, the general character of its
management, the convenience and needs of the community to be served, and
whether or not its corporate powers are consistent with the purposes of this
chapter.
74 Stat. 129 (1960), 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (Supp. IV, 1963).
9. Whether in fact this merger is anticompetitive is not within the purview of this
Note, for such a question "demands an examination into economic realities." United States
v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153, 183-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (dictum).
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Philadelphia National Bank decision. 10 The purpose and standards of section
7 will be contrasted with the purpose and standards specifically set out by
Congress for bank mergers.
In November of 1960 the Philadelphia National Bank and the Girard
Trust Corn Exchange adopted a plan of merger and filed an application for
approval with the Comptroller of Currency as required by the Bank Merger
Act" and section 215 of the national banking laws.1 2 In compliance with the
Bank Merger Act, the Comptroller received advisory reports on the com-
petitive factors involved from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, the Attorney General, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion.1 3 After a consideration of the items set forth as controlling 14 in the
Bank Merger Act the Comptroller found the merger to be in the public
interest and gave his approval. On the following day the Department of
Justice brought an action to enjoin the merger as an alleged violation of
section 7 of the Clayton Act and section 1 of the Sherman Act.' 5 The district
court concluded that the proposed merger did not violate section 7 of the
Clayton Act or section 1 of the Sherman Act and that section 7, as such, did
not apply to bank mergers.' From that decision the Department of Justice
appealed to the Supreme Court which reversed the district court and enjoined
the proposed merger due to its anticompetitive effects.'
7
In light of the opposing views taken as to the applicability of section 7 to
bank mergers, the history of the Clayton Act, more specifically section 7, has
importance. It is worthy to note that the original act prohibited, as being
anticompetitive, only those mergers effectuated by stock acquisitions.' 8 There-
fore, mergers consummated by way of an asset acquisition were not reached.
This limitation materially lessened the overall effectiveness of section 7, evi-
10. All mergers within the banking industry had been handled by one of the three
federal supervisory agencies in compliance with the Bank Merger Act, 74 Stat. 129 (1960),
12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (Supp. IV, 1963).
11. 74 Stat. 129 (1960), 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (Supp. IV, 1963).
12. 73 Stat. 460 (1959), 12 U.S.C. § 215 (Supp. IV, 1963).
13. 74 Stat. 129 (1960), 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (Supp. IV, 1963). This section pro-
vides in part:
[I]n the interests of uniform standards, before acting on a merger, consolidation,
acquisition of assets, or assumption of liabilities under this subsection, the agency
... shall request a report on the competitive factors from the Attorney General
and the other two banking agencies referred to in this subsection [Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the FDIC] . ...
14. Supra, note 8.
15. Since the Supreme Court did not consider the Sherman Act, it is not be dis-
cussed in this Note.
16. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 201 F. Supp. 348, 372 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
17. 374 U.S. at 371.
18. 78 Stat. 734 (1914). The usual mode of consolidation, when the act was passed,
was through the purchase of another's stock.
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denced by Arrow-Hart and Hegeman Elec. Co. v. FTC,'9 wherein the Su-
preme Court said:
[I] f the merger of the two manufacturing corporations and the combi-
nation of their assets was in any respect a violation of any anti-trust
law, as to which we express no opinion, it was necessarily a violation
of statutory prohibitions other than those found in the Clayton Act.
20
Aware of this loophole,21 Congress found it necessary to amend section 7
which now provides-
[N]o corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or in-
directly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and
no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Com-
mission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another
corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of com-
merce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may
be to substantially lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly.
22
Thus, acquisitions of assets were included within section 7 in addition to stock
acquisitions, but only in cases involving corporations subject to the juris-
diction of the FTC.
Prior to the ,decision in the instant case, it was generally accepted that
section 7 did not apply to bank mergers.2 3 The rationale was that banks are
not within the jurisdiction of the FTC ;24 thus, section 7 would only apply
if the bank merger were consummated through a stock acquisition, and
bank mergers are generally considered to be effectuated by asset acquisitions.2 5
Repeated attempts by Congress to amend section 7 to include bank mergers
indicate acceptance of this view.26 Even the Department of Justice voiced the
opinion that bank mergers were not within the scope of section 7.27 This view
is supported by the legislative reports of the bank-merger bill.2 8 In all prob-
19. 291 U.S. 587 (1934).
20. Id. at 599.
21. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 316 (1962); H.R. REP. No.
1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 11-12 (1949); S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(1950).
22. 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
23. See H.R. REP. No. 1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1960) ; S. REP. No. 196, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2, 5 (1959) ; Wemple & Cutler, The Federal Bank Merger and the
Antitrust Laws, 16 Bus. LAW. 994 (1961); Note, 75 HARV. L. REv. 756, 758 (1962);
Note, N.Y.U.L. REv. 735, 741 (1962).
24. See Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(a) (6), 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (6) (1958) ; 38 Stat. 721 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 46(b) (1958).
25. See note 23 supra.
26. See Funk, Antitrust Legislation Affecting Bank Mergers, 75 BANKING L.J. 369,
376-77 (1958).
27. Wemple & Cutler, supra note 23, at 1000.
28. Because section 7 is limited, insofar as banks are concerned, to cases where
a merger is accomplished through acquisition of stock, and because bank mergers
1964]
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ability one reason for the passage of the Bank Merger Act was the putative
inapplicability of section 7 to bank mergers.
2 9
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held the proposed merger within
the scope of section 7 "when read in light of the overriding congressional
purpose to control corporate concentrations tending to monopoly. '3 0 The Court
conceded that this was not the type of asset acquisition contemplated by the
prohibitions of section 7; this transaction was distinguished from the situation
in United States v. Columbia Steel Co. 3 1 The Court found, however,
that Congress intended to include such mergers within section 7, because
statutory bank mergers resemble stock acquisitions.
3 2
Thus, the stock acquisition provision of § 7, though reenacted in
haec verba by the 1950 amendment, must be deemed expanded in its
new context to include, at the very least, acquisitions by merger or
consolidations, transactions which entail a transfer of stock of the
parties, while the asset acquisition provision clearly reaches cor-
porate acquisitions involving no such transfers.
88
To the contrary, the district court held that bank mergers were not
within the scope of section 7, because each bank contributes all of its assets
in conformity with the statuteS4 relating to bank consolidations and merger of
assets.8 5 "The fact that certificates representing shares of stock are exchanged
for new ones is merely incidental to the transaction and in no way affects
or alters its character. '8 6 The district court was influenced in reaching its
decision by the fact that the committee reports on the bank merger bill
explicitly stated3 7 section 7 was inapplicable to bank mergers.
Did Congress intend to include bank mergers under section 7 of the
Clayton Act? In order to consider the Supreme Court's reasoning, it should
are accomplished by asset acquisitions rather than stock acquisition the act
[section 7] offers "little help" ....
H.R. REP. No. 1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1960).
29. See id. at 5; S. REP. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 8 (1959).
30. 374 U.S. at 338. "Since the literal terms of section 7 do not dispose of the
question, it must be determined whether there was a congressional design to embrace
bank mergers within the history of the statute." Id. at 337.
31. 334 U.S. 495 (1948) ; this case involved the purchase of the physical assets of
a competing firm in which there was no transfer of stock. (However, the purchase of
assets had the same economic results as a purchase of stock.)
32. The Court adopted the analogy as contended for by the United States. See Brief
for Appellants, pp. 75-79.
33. 374 U.S. at 346.
34. Under the banking statute, 73 Stat. 460 (1959), 12 U.S.C. § 215 (Supp. IV,
1963), the only transfer that will occur will be the transfer of assets by operation of law.
35. 201 F. Supp. at 357-60.
36. Id. at 359.
37. "Since bank mergers are customarily, if not invariably, carried out by asset
acquisitions, they are exempt from section 7 of the Clayton Act." S. REP. No. 196, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1959).
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be helpful to compare the purpose and standards of section 7 with those set
out by Congress for the banking industry-are the acts complimentary or
inconsistent in character?
Section 7 has as its primary purpose to prevent mergers which tend
toward the harmful lessening of competition.88 This is the standard set up for
all lines of commerce.3 9 Competition appears to be the sole criterion-"the
legislative history illuminates congressional concern with the protection of
competition." 40 The Supreme Court said that the merger in the instant case
was a violation of section 7, tending toward a concentration of banking in
the Philadelphia area which would substantially reduce the number of
banking alternatives to the consumer. 41 The fact that the merger would
increase the lending power and permit competition with out-of-state banks
held no weight with the Court.42 In connection with this reasoning the Court
stated in United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,43 "if the merger offends
the statute in any relevant market then good motives and even demonstrable
benefits are irrelevant and afford no defense."'44 It can be concluded that the
Clayton Act views mergers solely from the standard of competition 45 regardless
of the public interest involved. A question may exist as to whether this applica-
tion of the Clayton Act could not frustrate the most satisfactory operation
of the banking industry.
Commercial banking is a specialized, complicated business. Among its
more important services are the creation of additional money and credit,
the management of the checking account system, and the furnishing of
short-term loans.46 Because of the importance to the public of banking's
everyday functions, it has become "one of the most thoroughly and care-
fully regulated of all businesses. '47 Uniformity of regulation was attempted
by the National Banking Act 48 which gave Congress the power to enact
legislation for the protection and regulation of banks. The resulting net-
work of laws represents a complete system specially designed for the
establishment and government of both state and national banks.49 As early
38. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 317 (1962).
39. Banking is included within the meaning of commerce. See Transamerica Corp.
v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 901 (1953).
40. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
41. Had the merger been effectuated, it would have controlled at least 30% of the
banking business in the Philadelphia area. 374 U.S. at 363-67.
42. See id. at 371.
43. 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
44. Id. at 617.
45. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
46. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 324-30 (1963).
47. 5 TOULMIN, ANTITRUST LAWS § 2.1 (1950).
48. 13 Stat. 100 (1864), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 21 (1958).
49. Even the Clayton Act itself recognized banking as a "distinct economic opera-
tion." Berle, Banking Under the Anti-Trust Laws, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 589, 604 (1949).
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as 1819 Congress dealt with the banking business as a distinct field by
specialized legislation.50 This was the background considered in the enact-
ment of the Bank Merger Act of 1960.
Congress found it necessary to establish special standards to control bank
mergers. 51 The differences between the criteria fixed by Congress under the
Bank Merger Act for banks and those under section 7 for commerce gen-
erally have been indicated. Under the Bank Merger Act competition is dealt
with in relation to the needs of that particular industry,5 2 and emphasis is
placed on the overall effect of a contemplated merger upon the public interest.5 3
It is submitted that the application of section 7 of the Clayton Act does not
view banking functionally. In the Bethlehem Steel case the Court stated that
"the consideration to be accorded to benefits . . . which may flow from a
merger involving a substantial lessening of competition is a matter properly
to be urged upon Congress. It is outside the province of this court. '54 It is
further submitted that this is exactly what Congress did in the Bank Merger
Act. The separate standards set out for the banking industry appear to evidence
a realization on the part of Congress that it may be in the public interest to
approve a merger which lessens competition. Although these standards may
seem too broad in light of section 7, the area of public interest which that
section does not concern itself with has been stressed as vitally important
to the banking industry.
55
It appears that the proper weight to be accorded competition in deter-
mining whether a merger should be permitted has caused much confusion. 56
The meaning and relative importance of competitive activities varies
from industry to industry and from market to market. Since competi-
tion can't be directly measured, no single standard is applicable to
the whole range of American industries and markets.57
With this need for varying standards in mind it is submitted that section 7
and its underlying purposes are not consistent with the optimum operation
of the banking industry. The assurance of a sound banking system depends, in
part at least, upon other considerations.58 In the committee hearings on the
bank merger bill it was concluded "that the strict rule of the 1950 amendment
50. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
51. H.R. REP. No. 1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1960) ; S. REP. No. 196, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. 22 (1959).
52. See H.R. REP. No. 1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-12 (1960); S. REP. No. 196,
86th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1959).
53. See id. at 16, 19, 20, 22-23.
54. 168 F. Supp. at 617-18.
55. S. REP. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 16, 21, 23 (1959).
56. See id. at 1.
57. FTC, REPORT ON MERGERS AND AcQUISITIONS 171 (1955).
58. See 1962 COMPT. CuRR. ANN. REP. 145.
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of section 7 of the Clayton Act was inappropriate to the field of banking." 9
It was stated that the balanced approach set forth in the bank-merger bill
was the most appropriate for the banking industry.6 0 Nor should one lose
sight of the fact that banking is a business in which monopoly is unlikely
because of "the extensive blanket of state and federal regulation." '6 The
Supreme Court's application of section 7 to banks in the instant case has
set a precedent for future bank mergers. 62 It is not inconceivable that the
growth of banks may be stifled with adverse economic effects on the public
in areas where there is need for consolidation.6"
At this time if a bank merger is approved in accordance with the Bank
Merger Act, it is still subject to judicial review under the Clayton Act; this
means dual control of such mergers, which is inconsistent with what has been
termed the "outstanding example in federal government regulation of an
entire industry. '64 Two statutory interpretations of competition are applied;
before a merger can be consummated, it must meet the test of both. The Bank
Merger Act supposedly forestalled this problem, as evidenced by the following
comment supporting the passage of the act:
There is no justification for the continuance of the present incomplete
and confusing statutory provisions dealing with bank mergers. On the
contrary, it is essential to provide immediately for effective and uni-
form regulation of bank mergers under standards appropriate to the
industry.
6 5
However, as it presently stands, the Clayton Act appears to nullify the Bank
Merger Act. "The only vestige of the Bank Merger Act which remains is
that the banking agencies will have an initial veto."66 Congress provided no
express exemption from the Clayton Act in the Bank Merger Act.67 Perhaps
59. S. REP. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1959).
60. Id. at 21.
61. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 375 (1963) (dissenting
opinion).
62. There is one such merger pending. United States v. First National Bank & Trust
Co., U.S. Supreme Court No. 36, O.T. 1963, decision below, 208 F. Supp. 457 (E.D. Ky.
1962).
63. To adopt this rule [that of section 7] for bank mergers might result in the
disapproval of banks which all would agree were in the public interest ....
[T]hese results would be undesirable. The Committee therefore concluded that
it was preferable to handle bank mergers under rules specially designed for the
banking industry.
S. REP. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-21 (1959).
64. 1 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 4.04 (1958). There are three federal
supervisory agencies, as well as a state supervisory agency in every state.
65. S. REP. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1959).
66. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 373 (1963) (dissenting
opinion).
67. See S. REP. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1959). Compare the Interstate
Commerce Act, 41 Stat. 481 (1920), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 5(b) (9) (1958), where
there is provided an express exemption from antitrust laws.
1964]
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clarifying legislation is in order, which explicitly sets forth the standards to
be applied and who shall apply them.6
It would seem that the procedure applied to such an exempt organization
as the Civil Aeronautics Board6 9 might be appropriate for bank mergers.
Competition within the aviation industry, for example, is considered from a
broad view point7° in order to best meet the needs of the industry. This concept
is evidenced by Pan American World Airways v. United States,71 wherein it
was held that the Civil Aeronautics Board could enforce their competitive
standard although immunity from antitrust laws.existed.7 2 A uniform approach
should benefit not only the industry but the public as well. It is not contended
that banks should be exempt from antitrust regulation, but only that the
concept of one federal board considering all the factors which Congress deems
relevant would be appropriate for bank mergers.
CARMEN P. BELEFONTE
68. "The practicalities of enforcement are particularly important in respect to
mergers, and sufficiently serious to suggest, among other things, a much more precise
statutory standard than we now have." KAYSEN & TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 248 (1959).
69. The Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958) ex-
pressly exempts the Civil Aeronautics Board from section 7.
70. See Federal Aviation Act, 72 Stat. 740 (1958), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1302(d), 1378(b).
71. 371 U.S. 296 (1963).
72. Id. at 301-05.
TAYLOR AND SELBY APPEALS: THE NEWSPAPERMAN'S
TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE IN PENNSYLVANIA
The Pennsylvania newsman's privilege statute provides that a reporter
is not required "to disclose the source of any information . . . in any legal
proceeding .... -" A recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision, Taylor
and Selby Appeals,2 attached a two-fold meaning to the words "source of any
information." First, the phrase was held to refer to the identity of the in-
formant. Secondly, the phrase encompassed the documents and tape recordings
containing the information supplied by the informant. Furthermore, the court
held that the privilege may be waived by the newsman. However, such "waiver
by a newsman applies only to the statements made by the informer which are
actually published or publicly disclosed and not to other statements made
by the informer to the newspaper."13 Since this is the first case to construe
the Pennsylvania statute, it is the purpose of this Case Note to determine
whether the court has over-extended the privilege by inclusion of the in-
former's information within the protection of the statute. This determination
will be accomplished through an analysis of the case law and statutes con-
cerned with the privilege, as well as the theoretical and policy considerations
surrounding the privilege.
Taylor was an appeal from contempt convictions arising out of the
refusal of two newsmen 4 to answer questions and produce before the grand
jury certain subpoenaed documents and tape recordings. 5 The journalists
1. No person, engaged on, connected with, or employed by any newspaper of
general circulation as defined by the laws of this Commonwealth, or any press
association or any radio or television station, for the purpose of gathering, pro-
curing, compiling, editing or publishing news, shall be required to disclose the
source of any information procured or obtained by such person, in any legal
proceeding, trial or investigation before any court, grand jury, traverse or petit
jury, or any officer thereof, before the General Assembly or any committee
thereof, before any commission, department, or bureau of this Commonwealth, or
before any county or municipal body, officer, or committee thereof.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 330 (Supp. 1962).
2. 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963).
3. Id. at 44, 193 A.2d at 186.
4. Robert Taylor is the president of The Bulletin Company and general manager
of the Philadelphia Bulletin. Earl Selby, the other journalist, is the city editor of the
Evening and Sunday Bulletin.
5. The subpoena directed Robert Taylor-
And bring with you: All tape recordings, written statements, Memoranda
of interviews, conversations, conferences had with John J. Fitzpatrick.
And further bring with you: All copies of statements given by John J. Fitz-
patrick to the District Attorney on February 20, 1962, portions of which appeared
in the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin on December 30, 1962.
Record, p. 4a. Earl Selby was directed-
And bring with you: all tape recordings of conferences, interviews, discus-
sions, interrogations or conversations with John Fitzpatrick.
And further bring with you: all memorandum, notes, reports and other docu-
ments of or pertaining to conferences, interviews, discussions, interrogations or
conversations with John Fitzpatrick.
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invoked the privilege statute as a defense. A Philadelphia Evening Bulletin
article,6 which contained the First Assistant District Attorney's interroga-
tions of former Democratic ward leader, John Fitzpatrick, prompted the calling
of the newsmen before the grand jury. In adjudging the newsmen guilty of
contempt the lower court stated, "the privilege not 'to disclose the source of
any information' applies only to the identity of the informer, and not to his
communications as such, or the information procured."'7 The lower court
further held that the newspaper had waived the privilege by indicating in the
article that the subsequent questioning of Fitzpatrick dealt with his com-
munications to Bulletin reporters. Thus, the identity of the informant, Fitz-
patrick, had been disclosed; and the documents and tape recordings relating
to what Fitzpatrick had told Bulletin reporters should have been produced.
However, other items called for in the subpoena duces tecum remained
privileged, because a revelation of their contents might have indicated the
names of other individuals who supplied them to the newspaper.
A number of arguments have been advanced for8 and against9 the
And further bring with you: all memorandum, notes, reports and other docu-
ments of or pertaining to investigations conducted as a result of information
furnished by John Fitzpatrick.
And further bring with you: all records of expenses incurred directly or
indirectly in gathering information from, or conducting conferences, investiga-
tions, discussions, interrogations or conversations with John Fitzpatrick.
And further bring with you: all documents of or pertaining to the examina-
tion of John Fitzpatrick by polygraph examiners, physicians, psychologists or
other experts.
And further bring with you: any and all other documents of or pertaining
to John Fitzpatrick.
Record, pp. 2a-3a.
6. Philadelphia Sunday Bulletin, Dec. 30, 1962.
7. Record, p. 126a. (Emphasis added.)
8. Arguments advanced in favor of the privilege may be presented as follows:
(1) the journalist has a moral and ethical obligation to protect the identity of his
informant; (2) the journalist must protect his sources so that he will continue to receive
information, which will be offered to the public, ultimately resulting in a free flow of
information; (3) the press contributes to the public welfare by presenting information,
such as the exposure of corrupt public officials, which could only be obtained through the
use of confidential sources ; (4) the journalist, in serving the public is as much entitled to
a privilege of professional secrecy as the clergyman, doctor, or lawyer; (5) public agencies,
which have far greater resources than the journalist, will be able to obtain the same
information given to the journalist by the use of leads furnished by the journalist which
do not include the breach of confidence between him and his informant. INTERNATIONAL
PRESS INSTITUTE, PROFESSIONAL SECRECY AND THE JOURNALIST 234 (1962).
9. Arguments advanced against the establishment of the privilege are as follows:
(1) The proper administration of justice will be severely restricted unless the court has
a right to demand the disclosure of all relevant information. (2) The journalist is removed
from the traditional area of privilege, because the doctor, lawyer, and clergyman receives
information with an understanding that it is not to be made known whereas the journalist
receives information in order to have it published. (3) The newspaper's contributions inl
the area of public welfare are of equal excellence in those jurisdictions where no privilege
exists. (4) The journalist, if given a testimonial privilege, might himself or through
information supplied by an informant, publish false and biased information designed to
benefit his own personal interest. INTERNATIONAL PRESS INSTITUTE, op. cit. supra note 8,
[Vol. 68
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privilege. By summarizing the primary considerations behind each position,
it is possible to compare the two views and perhaps determine the proper
scope of the privilege. Journalists argue that the public is benefited by a free
flow of news and information which would otherwise be restrained if in-
formants refused to supply information because of a fear of exposure.' 0 On
the other hand, it is concluded that the public's interest in the proper admin-
istration of justice demands a full disclosure of information in all legal
proceedings. I x With the basic policy conflicts set forth, the question remaining
is whether the case law' 2 and statutes dealing with the privilege afford guides
to a suitable compromise of this conflict.
In the absence of statutory privilege, the common-law decisions have held
that a newspaper reporter is not privileged to refuse to disclose his source of
information.'l Such cases have based their holdings on the rationale that the
public's interest in the proper administration of justice requires a full dis-
closure of information.' 4 In these decisions the journalist was held in contempt
of court for refusing to reveal the name of the informant (as distinguished from
the information itself).15
Although eleven jurisdictions in addition to Pennsylvania have enacted
statutes affording the journalist a testimonial privilege, 16 State v. Donovan17
is the only reported case construing the scope of the privilege. In the Donovan
case a New Jersey newspaper editor invoked that state's privilege statute,' 8
at 234-35. (5) The abuse of other testimonial privileges is protected against by the control
of state licensing boards and by discipline imposed by professional organizations, whereas
no such supervision is provided for in the administration of the journalist's testimonial
privilege. NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMM'N LEG. Doc. No. 65(A) 26 (1949).
10. INTERNATIONAL PRESS INSTITUTE, op. cit. supra note 8, at 234.
11. People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff, 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E. 415 (1936).
12. For a full discussion of cases concerning the newsman's testimonial privilege
see Note, 35 NEB. L. REV. 562 (1956) ; 34 TEMP. L.Q. 432 (1959) ; Note, 36 VA. L. REV.
61 (1950).
13. In re Goodfader's Appeal, 45 Hawaii 317, 367 P.2d 472 (1961) ; People ex rel.
Mooney v. Sheriff, 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E. 415 (1936).
14. See ibid.
15. See, e.g., ibid. For a full discussion of this distinction see Brief for Appellee,
pp. 26-29, Taylor and Selby Appeals, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963).
16. ALA. CoDE ANN. tit. 7, § 370 (1960); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2237
(Supp. 1963) ; ARK. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 917 (Supp. 1961); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 1881(16) (Supp. 1962) ; IND. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 1773 (Supp. 1963) ; Ky. REV. STAT.
ch. 421.100 (1963) ; MD. CODE ANN., art. 35, § 2 (1957) ; MIcH. STAT. ANN. tit. 28,
§ 945(1) (1954) ; MONT. REv. CODES ANN. tit. 93, ch. 601-2 (Supp. 1961) ; N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (Supp. 1962); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.12 (1958).
17. 129 N.J.L. 478, 30 A.2d 421 (1943).
18. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:81-10 (1952)
No person engaged on, connected with or employed on any newspaper shall
be compelled to disclose, in any legal proceeding or trial, before any court, before
any grand jury or any county or petit jury of any court, before the presiding
officer of any tribunal or his agent, or before any committee of the legislature,
or elsewhere, the source of information procured or obtained by him and pub-




and refused to answer questions concerning the identity of the messenger who
had delivered the information.'0 With an eye to the critical attitude taken by
treatise writers and courts toward the granting of a journalist's testimonial
privilege, the court in the Donovan case applied the canon of construction that
statutes in derogation of the common law should be strictly construed. Thus,
the court held that "source" referred solely to the identity of the informant
and not to the identity of the messenger who delivered the information. "No
reason, legitimate to the legislative intent as we understand that intent, appears
why the vehicle of transmission should not be revealed. '20 However, the
authority that the New Jersey court's strict construction of the word "source"
has in Pennsylvania is questionable, since Pennsylvania's Statutory Construc-
tion Act provides: "The rule that laws in derogation of the common laws are
to be strictly construed shall have no application to the laws of this Common-
wealth."
2 1
A dissent was filed in the Donovan decision in which the judge concluded
that:
The source of the newspaper man's information is the agency, person
or means by which the information was communicated to him, and
not the person who is said to have originated the news. As I construe
it, the statute was designed to avoid disclosure of the name of the
person who supplied the information, hence I cannot agree with the
construction of the majority opinion.
22
Even this liberal construction of the statute still limits definition of "source"
to the identity of an individual. In 1960 the New Jersey statute was amended.
23
The reworded act conforms to the dissent in the Donovan case. It may be
that the amended statute, which privileges disclosure of the "means" or
"agency" through which information is received will be construed to apply
19. State v. Donovan, 129 N.J.L. 478, 484-85, 30 A.2d 421, 425. The relevant
testimony is as follows:
Q. Weren't the men who made the statements the source of the information?
A. Exactly.
Q. So there is no secret about that because that was published in your newspaper?
A. That is right.
Q. The fact that they made those particular statements?
A. That is right.
Q. So knowing the source and having printed it in your newspaper, I now ask
you by what means the source of information, which was the individual who
sought publicity, conveyed the releases to you or to your paper for publica-
tion ?
A. I decline to answer the question.
20. Id. at 487, 30 A.2d at 426.
21. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 558 (1952).
22. State v. Donovan, 129 N.J.L. 478, 490, 30 A.2d 421, 428.
23. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (Supp. 1963).
Subject to Rule 37, a person engaged on, connected with, or employed by, a
newspaper has a privilege to refuse to disclose the source, author, means, agency
or person from or through whom any information published in such newspaper
was procured, obtained, supplied, furnished, or delivered.
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to inanimate objects such as tape recordings and documents. "[S]ource of
information" is the only descriptive term used in the Pennsylvania act.
An unreported Maryland case,2 4 construing a statute2 5 similar to the
Pennsylvania act, sheds some light on the scope of the privilege. Hamilton
Owens, editor of a Baltimore newspaper, was summoned before a grand jury
and asked to produce the original copy of a letter published in the newspaper
and to reveal the identity of its author. Owens, relying on the Maryland
statute, refused to produce the document because the letter's contents contained
the author's name.2 6 The court agreed in an extemporaneous opinion,27 and
the case indicates that documents do fall within the purview of the privilege
statutes if their contents would reveal the informer's identity.
An examination of the privilege statutes in the eleven other jurisdictions
having them serves a useful purpose in interpreting the scope of the privilege
in Pennsylvania. Ten states have statutes similar in wording to the Pennsyl-
vania statute in that they all privilege the reporter's "source of information."28
Michigan, however, employs different language. Michigan's statute states
that "communications between reporters of newspapers . . . and their in-
formants are . . . privileged and confidential. ' 29 Within the same section is
contained the attorney-client privilege, the physician-patient privilege, and
the clergyman-penitent privilege. Noting that the purpose of these respective
privileges is to protect the confidential information received, the term "com-
munications" was said to refer to information and not to the identity of the
individual supplying such information. Pennsylvania by statute also privileges
communications between the attorney and his client,30 "information" revealed
to a clergyman by a penitent,31 and "information" disclosed to a physician by
his patient.3 2 The District Attorney's office in Taylor stressed the fact that
if the legislative intent was to privilege the communication or information,
24. State v. Hamilton Owens, No. 677 Misc. 1925, Circuit Court, Carroll County,
Md., May 11, 1925.
25. Mo. CODE ANN. art. 35, § 2 (1957). The Maryland statute enacted in 1896
privileges the newsman from revealing "the source of any news or information."
26. Record, p. 128a, Taylor and Selby Appeals, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963).
27. Editor & Publisher, May 16, 1925, p. 42.
28. See Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland,
Montana, New Jersey, and Ohio statutes cited note 16 supra.
29. MICH. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 945(1) (1954). (Emphasis added.)
In any inquiry authorized by this act communications between reporters of
newspapers or other publications and their informants are hereby declared to be
privileged and confidential. Any communications between attorneys and their
clients, between clergymen and the members of their respective churches, and
between physicians and their patients are hereby declared to be privileged and
confidential when such communications were necessary to enable such attorneys,
clergymen, or physicians to serve as such attorney, clergyman, or physician.
30. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 321 (1958).
31. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 331 (Supp. 1962).
32. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 328 (1958).
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more suitable language might have been chosen as it was for the Michigan
statute.
33
Six of the twelve privilege statutes require publication of the information
before the source is protected.3 4 (The Pennsylvania statute does not require
publication for the privilege to exist.) This requirement implies that "source"
does not refer to the information; before the statute can be invoked the in-
forrfiation must have been made public.
Since no debate took place, and no committee .reports were published
concerning the adoption of the newsman's privilege bill in Pennsylvania,3 5 it
is difficult to determine the intent of the legislature. Attorneys for both the
appellants and the appellee attempted to ascertain this intent by using perti-
nent provisions of the Pennsylvania Statutory Construction Act to support
their arguments. Appellants urged that the term "source of any information"
must be construed according to its "common and approved usage. '3 6 This
usage, referred to in the appellants' brief and found in standard dictionaries,
defines "source" as: "One who or that which supplies information; spec., a
document or book presenting evidence as to facts or events . . . . , In applying
the same canon of construction, the appellee reasoned that a broad construction
of the word "source" would result in a meaning "inconsistent with the
manifest intent of the Legislature.1
3 8
For the purpose of getting an insight into the legislative intent, it might
be more helpful to recall that newsmen had been questioned by official bodies
solely as to the name of their informant. It is suggested that the Pennsylvania
legislature enacted the newsman's privilege statute for the express purpose
of eliminating the penalties that were imposed upon newsmen for their refusal
to reveal the names of their informants.3 9 Since the common-law cases never
concerned themselves with the information itself, it is difficult to conclude
that the legislature intended the privilege to extend to the informer's revela-
tions. Some support for this proposition is found in the legislative debate
concerning the amendment 40 extending the privilege to radio and TV news
33. Brief for Appellee, pp. 30-31.
34. See Alabama, Arizona, California, Kentucky, Maryland, and New Jersey
statutes cited note 16 supra.
35. 4 PA. LEG. J. 4438 (1937).
36. Brief for Appellant, pp. 13-14. The Appellant used WEBSTER, NEW INTER-
NATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1934) for the definition that is stated in the text of the
paper.
37. Id. at 14.
38. Brief for Appellee, p. 28.
39. See id. at 29.
40. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 330 (Supp. 1962).
(b) The provisions of subsection (a) hereof in so far as they relate to radio or
television stations shall not apply unless the radio or television station maintains
and keeps open for inspection, for a period of at least one year from the date of
the actual broadcast or telecast, an exact recording, transcription, kinescopic
film or certified written transcript of the actual broadcast or telecast.
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media. During that debate, a differentiation was made between "information"
and the "source" of that information.
4 '
An analysis of the closely related public officers' testimonial privilege is
of value in determining what should be the scope of the privilege in question.
It has been well established that public officers are privileged from testifying
as to the identity of their informants. 42 The granting of this privilege, as
indicated in Rovario v. United States,43 is based on the rationale that the
public interest in effective law enforcement is furthered by communications
from citizens to enforcement agencies concerning the commission of crimes.
These communications are encouraged by an assurance that the informer's
identity will remain secret. However, this is not an absolute privilege, for the
identity of the informant must be revealed where it is essential to the defense
of the accused, or necessary for a proper disposition of the issues in the case.
4
The privilege may also be taken away in order to disprove false testimony.4 5
Thus, a basic policy of fairness governs the limitations imposed; and where
the court requires disclosure, the government must reveal the informer's
identity or have its prosecution dismissed.
46
Generally communications from the informer have been held not to be
shielded by the public officer's privilege. 47 Where, however, the contents of
the communications would tend to reveal the identity of the informer, the
communications are privileged. 48 In Bowman iDairy Co. v. United States4 9 the
court held that under rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
the defendant had a right to subpoena information received by the Govern-
ment from its informers. The following limitation concerning the production
of these documents was noted:
Where the court concludes that such material ought to be produced,
it should, of course, be solicitous to protect against disclosure of the
identity of the informants, and the method, manner and circum-
stances of the Government's acquisition of the materials. 50
41. 4 PA. LEG. J. 4197 (1959).
[W]e are giving a radio or TV station the right to refuse to disclose the
source of information and are giving them the right to disseminate the informa-
tion no matter how careless they may be in checking out the validity and the
authority of the information that has been given.
42. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2374, at 762 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
43. 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
44. Wilson v. United States, 59 F.2d 390 (1932).
45. 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 42, § 2374, at 768.
46. Rovario v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
47. 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 42, § 2374, at 765.
48. Rovario v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
49. 341 U.S. 214 (1951).
50. Id. at 221.
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This view has been supported by the draftsmen of the Uniform Rules of
Evidence and the Model Code of Evidence. 51
Since the main object of both the public officer's privilege and the
journalist's privilege is to protect the identity of the informant, those standards
of interpretation applied to the public officer's privilege may suggest desirable
limitations on the newsman's privilege. It would appear that documents and
other materials should only be privileged when their production would tend
to reveal the identity of the journalist's informant. Otherwise, all information
acquired by the newspaper should be subject to the ordinary processes of
discovery.
Taylor also stands for the proposition that the newsman may waive the
privilege, although in this case the privilege was not waived. The waiver
"applies only to the statements made by the informer which are actually
published or publicly disclosed and not to other statements made by the
informer to the newspaper." 52 Thus, documents evidencing statements already
published would have to be revealed, because the privilege would be waived.
Although other courts have not discussed waiver in relation to documents, they
are in harmony with the Pennsylvania view that the newsman has the sole
power to waive.
In Brogan v. Passaic Daily News 53 the court held that the New Jersey
statute was waived when an editor's testimony at a libel trial was to the effect
that he has received the information in question from a reliable source. Remark-
ing that the statute is permissive and not mandatory, the court stated that the
newsman, and not the informant, has the sole option to waive the privilege
by a disclosure of the informer's identity. The court reasoned that if the
privilege were upheld in this instance the plaintiff would be unable to
effectively challenge the libel defenses of fair comment and lack of malice,
because the jury would be unable to consider the reliability of the source if it
were held that the privilege was not waived. Such a holding would grant to
the newspaper free reign to reveal information favorable to its case but plead
the privilege in order to conceal facts detrimental to its cause. "[T] his would
51. 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 42, § 2374 nn.2 & 4. UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE
36 (Identity of Informant) provides:
A witness has a privilege to refuse to disclose the identity of a person who
has furnished information purporting to disclose a violation of a provision of the
laws of this State or of the United States, to a representative of the State or of
the United States or a government division thereof, charged with the duty of
enforcing that provision, and evidence thereof is inadmissible, unless the judge
finds that (a) the identity of the person furnishing the information has already
been otherwise disclosed or (b) disclosure of his identity is essential to a fair
determination of the issues.
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 230 (1940) provides in a comment:
The rule does not make evidence of the content of the information inad-
missible except where that would reveal the identity of the informer.
52. 412 Pa. at 44, 193 A.2d at 186.
53. 22 N.J. 139, 123 A.2d 473 (1956).
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amount to using the statute as a sword rather than a shield as was intended
when the statute was enacted. ' 54 Made aware by this case of the danger of
not providing for waiver in the statute, the state legislature amended the act
to provide that the statute could be waived by a previous disclosure or by
contract.55
A California court in Application of Howard56 ruled that a newsman's
source of information was not disclosed by the use of quotation marks around
a statement attributed to one Andrade. The court reasoned that the statement
could have been obtained from a record, press release, or from an individual
who phoned the story to the newspaper. The court did mention that if the
name of the informer were disclosed the privilege would be waived. 57
Although the Pennsylvania act makes no provision for waiver, the court's
ruling that the newsman may waive the privilege is wholly inconsistent with
the waiver provisions set forth in other professional privilege statutes enacted
in Pennsylvania.5" Since the other statutes afford the one protected the option
of waiver, it would appear to logically follow that the informant should have
the option to waive. Under Taylor the informant's identity does not receive
absolute protection, for the newsman may decide to waive the privilege when
the informer's vital interests are at stake.
To further analyze the court's interpretation of the statute, a discussion
of the theoretical principles behind privileged communications is in order.
Professor Wigmore, remarking that the principle of privilege is an exception
to the duty upon everyone to testify, sets down four conditions necessary for
the establishment of a testimonial privilege.5 9 As the relationship between a
journalist and his informant is one of continuing confidence, the first two
conditions are met. The third condition is met if it is safe to assume that
54. Id. at 152, 123 A.2d at 480.
55. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A :84A-29 (Supp. 1963).
Rule 37
A person waives his right or privilege to refuse to disclose or to prevent
another from disclosing a specified matter if he or any other person while the
holder thereof has (a) contracted with anyone not to claim the right or privilege
or, (b) without coercion and with knowledge of his right or privilege, made
disclosure of any part of the privileged matter or consented to such a disclosure
made by anyone.
56. 136 Cal. App. 2d 816, 289 P.2d 537 (1955).
57. Id. at 818, 289 P.2d at 538 (dictum).
58. See Pennsylvania statutes cited notes 30, 31, and 32 supra.
59. 8 WGMORE, op. cit. supra note 42, § 2285, at 527.
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be
disclosed.
(2) The element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory
maintenance of the relation of the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be
sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the com-




informers will be less prone to supply information if their identity is subject
to disclosure, because the free flow of news is in the public interest. 60 In com-
menting on the fourth condition Dr. Fredrick Siebert"' suggested that when
the right to learn the informer's identity seriously interferes with the acquisi-
tion and dissemination of news, then the demand for disclosure should be
seriously questioned; at the same time, however, Dr. Siebert recognized the
right of courts to compel the disclosure of relevant information. He also clearly
pqinted out that the privilege attaches only to the identity of the informant
and not to the information.
One additional point needs clarification. What the journalist is con-
cealing is not information in the sense that a lawyer, a doctor, or a
clergyman is privileged to conceal information. It is obvious that each
of these three groups of professional men have access to information
which on occasion would be extremely valuable evidence in a court
of law. What the journalist is concealing is not information, but the
source of information, the name or names of his informers. All the
information which the journalist has gathered is available in published
form. His main purpose is to publish this information and make it
available to everyone, including the members of the legislature, the
courts, and the public. All the journalist is attempting to do is keep
open the channels of his information by protecting those sources
which fear reprisal.
2
It would seem rather difficult to justify the extension of the privilege to
include the informer's communications on a theoretical basis, for then the
free flow of news would be restricted and conditions three and four would
not be met.
Evidence authorities such as Morgan are entirely opposed to the jour-
nalist's testimonial privilege;6 5 and it is significant to note that the Model
Code of Evidence and the Uniform Rules of Evidence make no mention of a
journalist's privilege. 4 The American Bar Association has also adopted a
hostile attitude toward the privilege.65 After a fifteen-nonth study the Amer-
60. INTERNATIONAL PRESS INSTITUTE, PROFESSIONAL SECRECY AND THIE JOURNALIST
175 (1962).
61. Dr. Fredrick S. Siebert, trained in the law, author of books on legal aspects
of journalism, and Director of the Division of Mass Communications, Michigan
State University, analyzed Dean Wigmore's four "tests" in an address at an Inter-
national Symposium on the Professional Secrecy of the Journalist, conducted at
the University of Strasbourg, in France, during October 1958, under the auspices
of the International Association for Mass Communications Research.
Id. at 175.
62. INTERNATIONAL PRESS INSTITUTE, Op. cit. supra note 60, at 176.
63. NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMM'N LEG. Doc. No. 65(A) 35 (1949).
64. 8 WIGMORE, oP. cit. supra note 42, § 2286, at 537.
65. INTERNATIONAL PRESS INSTITUTE, Op. cit. supra note 60, at 178.
Of recent years, there have appeared on the statute books of several legis-
latures certain novel privileges of secrecy. Their history has not been traced; but
they bear the marks of having been enacted at the instances of certain occupa-
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ican Civil Liberties Union concluded the present legislation in the area was
inadequate because it granted newsmen an absolute testimonial privilege.66
The Civil Liberties Union in its report also criticized the present statutes for
failing to resolve the conflict between the interest of the public in the free
flow of information and the public interest in the unhampered administration
of justice. In view of this professional opposition to the privilege statutes,
perhaps a strict construction of the Pennsylvania statute was in order.
Reconciliation of the policy conflict noted by the Civil Liberties Union
is essential to a determination of the proper scope of the privilege. One solu-
tion of this conflict was suggested in the Rovario case where the Court said of
the analogous public officer privilege-
We believe that no fixed rule with respect to disclosure is justifiable.
The problem is one that calls for balancing the public interest in pro-
tecting the free flow of information against the individual's right to
prepare his defense. Whether a proper balance renders non-disclosure
erroneous must depend on the particular circumstances of each case,
taking into consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses,
the possible significance of the informer's testimony and other rele-
vant factors.
67
The newsman's privilege statute as presently worded, and the court's con-
struction of this act leaves little room for the balancing of the public interests
involved. In granting a very broad privilege the court seems to have dis-
counted the public interest in the proper administration of justice. The fol-
lowing illuminates the philosophy of the court:
The Act must therefore, we repeat, be liberally and broadly construed
in order to carry out the clear objective and intent of the Legislature
which has placed the gathering and the protection of the source of
news as of greater importance to the public interest and of more
value to the public welfare than the disclosure of the alleged crime or
the alleged criminal. 6s
tional organizations of semi-national scope. The demand for these privileges seems
to be in part due to the desire to give it some mark of professional status, and in
part to the invocation of a false analogy to the long-established privileges for
certain professional communications.
The analogies are not convincing (though this is not the place for a demon-
stration). Moreover, the tendency is an unwholesome one. Yet it threatens to
spread not only to legislatures but to other occupations. The correct tendency
would rather be to cut down the scope of the existing privileges, instead of to
create any new ones. We recommend that the legislatures refuse to create any
new privileges for secrecy in any occupation; and particularly we recommend
against any further recognition of
A) Privilege of information obtained by Accountants;
B) Privilege for information obtained by Social Workers;
C) Privilege for information obtained by Journalists.
66. N.Y. Times, March 18, 1959, p. 75.
67. Rovario v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 62 (1957).




There are drawbacks to the liberal view of the privilege taken by the
court. Privileging information leaves open the possibility that newspapers
may suppress vital evidence, the disclosure of which is in the public interest,
by asserting that production of the information will reveal the identity of
the informant. An example will serve to illustrate the danger. An unethical
newspaper in order to protect its own political interests may refuse to produce
documents necessary for the indictment of a corrupt public official. In this
situation the security of the state is threatened, and the administration of
justice is hampered.
In order to balance the public interests, a qualified privilege could be
enacted. For example, a section similar to the following provision originated
by the New York Law Revision Commission could be annexed to the Pennsyl-
vania newsman's privilege statute.
In any case where a reporter claims the privilege conferred by this
section, the body, officer, person, or party seeking this information
may apply to the supreme court for an order divesting the reporter
of the privilege . . . . The order shall be granted only when the
court, after hearing the parties, shall find that disclosure is essential
to the protection of the public interest. Any such order shall be
appealable .... 69
Consideration of each case on its merits with a balancing-of-interests
approach seems advisable. Furthermore, an analysis of the privilege would
seem to indicate that information should not be privileged unless a court is
satisfied that production of the information will reveal the identity of the
informant, even with all references to names deleted. If, however, the informa-
tion is of unqualified importance to the public welfare, disclosure should be
made even if that means revealing the identity of the informant.
ROBERT H. MILLER
69. NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMM'N LEG. Doc. No. 65(A) 28-29 (1949).
GUTIERREZ v. WATERMAN STEAMSHIP CORPORATION:
THE SCOPE OF THE DOCTRINE
OF UNSEAWORTHINESS
Gutierrez, a longshoreman unloading the S.S. Hastings at Ponce, Puerto
Rico, slipped on some loose beans spilled on the dock from broken and de-
fective bags in which the beans were shipped. In the district court the jury
found that the longshoreman's injuries were proximately caused by the
negligence of the steamship company,1 and the unseaworthiness of its cargo
and cargo containers.2 The court of appeals in an opinion by Judge Aldrich,
vacated the judgment below and remanded with orders to dismiss, holding
that the shipowner was not responsible for the lading, or cargo containers.8
He stated: "The very fact that unseaworthiness obligations are 'awesome'
... suggests that they should not be handled with prodigality. We are un-
willing to recognize one here."'4 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari- and, reversing the court of appeals, held that the use of defective
cargo containers constitutes unseaworthiness, and that the shipowner's war-
ranty of seaworthiness extends to longshoremen on the pier who are unloading
the ship's cargo.6 The purpose of this Case Note is to consider whether or not
the second holding is a logical or practical extension of unseaworthiness in
light of the origin and development of that doctrine. Consideration will be
given to the test utilized to determine the scope of the doctrine of unsea-
worthiness. The possibility of the doctrine's future extension will be examined.
Unseaworthiness originated in cases in which mariners were suing for
wages owed them by their employers. In those cases mariners alleged unsea-
worthiness of the vessel to excuse desertion or misconduct which if unexcused
would result in forfeiture of all wages.7 For the first time in the famous dictum
of Mr. Justice Brown in The Osceola unseaworthiness was mentioned in
connection with a seaman's personal injury action. 8 He stated that a ship-
owner would incur liability to indemnify a seaman for personal injuries
resulting from the unseaworthiness of the ship. Later cases using this dictum
as a basis, interpreted the shipowner's duty to provide a seaworthy ship for
his seamen as an absolute duty not in any way connected with the exercise
1. The question of negligence presented in this case will not be discussed.
2. Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 193 F. Supp. 894 (D.P.R. 1961).
3. Waterman S.S. Corp v. Gutierrez, 301 F.2d 415 (1st Cir. 1962).
4. Id. at 417.
5. Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 371 U.S. 810 (1962).
6. Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963).
7. See Price v. The Polly & Kitty, 20 Fed. Cas. 666 (No. 11754) (D. Pa. 1789)
Dixon v. The Cyrus, 7 Fed. Cas. 755 (No. 3930) (D. Pa. 1789).
8. 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903). The injury in the case did not result from unseaworthi-
ness, but rather from an improvident order negligently given by the master.
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of due care. 9 In Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co.,10 the Supreme Court in an
opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Stone explained why the exercise of due diligence
by the shipowner did not relieve the shipowner of his obligation to his seamen
to furnish adequate appliances and a seaworthy ship. The Court said:
We have often had occasion to emphasize the conditions of the sea-
man's employment,. . . which have been deemed to make him a ward
of the admiralty and to place large responsibility for his safety on
the owner. He is subject to the rigorous discipline of the sea, and all
the conditions of his service constrain him to accept, without critical
examination and without protest, working conditions and appliances
as commanded by his superior officers. These conditions ... have
generated the exacting requirement that the vessel or the owner must
provide the seaman with seaworthy appliances with which to do his
work .... "
While the authority of the Court in this case has been questioned,'12 the needs
of seamen were clearly and dramatically set out to make clear the policy
reasons for the decision.
A giant step was taken by the Supreme Court in the leading case of
Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki13 to enlarge the scope of the doctrine. The
shipowner's duty to provide a seaworthy vessel was extended to longshore-
men. Waves of vigorous judicial dissent from the holding are felt even in
the present era; Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent in the instant case is an
example.14 In Sieracki the longshoreman, employed by an independent steve-
dore, received his injuries on board the ship. Mr. Chief Justice Stone, writing
the majority opinion, recognized that the decision and reasons therefor given
by the Court "created a new right in maritime workers, not members of the
crew of a vessel, which has not hitherto been recognized by the maritime law
or by any statute.'
15
The Court in Sieracki disposed of the notion that the obligation to furnish
a seaworthy vessel arose out of any express or implied contractual duty owed
to a seaman.' 6 Rather a "humanitarian policy" demanded the- protection of
9. See The H. A. Scandrett, 87 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1937) (dictum) ; Carlisle Packing
Co. v. Sandanger, 259 U.S. 255 (1922) (dictum).
10. 321 U.S. 96 (1944) (defective rope caused staging to give way injuring seaman).
11. Id. at 103.
12. Tetreault, Seamen, Seaworthiness, and the Rights of Harbor Workers, 39
CORNELL L.Q. 381, 397 (1954).
13. 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
14. 373 U.S. at 216.
15. 328 U.S. at 85.
16. The Court said:
[C]onsiderations arising from the hazards which maritime service places upon
men who perform it, rather than any consensual basis of responsibility, have
been the paramount influences dictating the shipowner's liability for unseaworthi-
ness as well as its absolute character. It is essentially a species of liability without
fault, analogous to other well known instances in our law. Derived from and
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injured longshoremen. The crux of the Court's rationale for giving longshore-
men the traditional seamen's remedy is found in the following language:
[H ] istorically the work of loading and unloading is the work of ship's
service, performed until recent times by members of the crew ...
That the owner seeks to have it done with the advantages of more
modern divisions of labor, does not minimize the worker's hazard and
should not nullify his protection .... Accordingly we think . . .that
the liability arises as an incident, not merely of the seaman's contract,
but of performing the ship's service with the owner's consent.' 7
A longshoreman was entitled to the rights of a seaman as to the protection
'offered by the doctrine of unseaworthiness, "because he is doing a seaman's
work and incurring a seaman's hazards."' 8
It is submitted that the decision of the Supreme Court in Sieracki was
not justified either as a logical extension of the doctrine of unseaworthiness
or as a necessary extension by reason 'of practical considerations. The cases
culminating in Gutierrez have extended the doctrine of unseaworthiness to a
class of workers not originally thought of as within its scope. Cases prior
to I9 and subsequent to20 Sieracki disclose two major reasons for allowing
seamen the extraordinary remedy: (1) Sailors embarking on a voyage en-
countered the tempestuous forces of nature and were unable to leave the vessel
when a dangerous condition arose.2 1 (2) A philosophy in favor of placing the
losses of the trade on those best able to bear them developed.
The first reason would not seem applicable to longshoremen or any other
class except seamen. As was stated in Sieracki in Mr. Chief Justice Stone's
dissenting opinion:
Longshoremen and harbor workers are in a class very different from
seamen, and one not calling for the creation of extraordinary obliga-
tions of the vessel or its owner in their favor, more than other classes
of essentially land workers. Unlike members of the crew of a vessel
they do not go to sea, they are not subject to the rigid discipline of
the sea; they are not prevented by the law or ship's discipline from
leaving the vessel on which they may be employed; they have the
same recourse as land workers to avoid the hazards to which they are
shaped to meet hazards which performing the service imposes, the liability is
neither limited by conceptions of negligence nor contractual in character ....
It is a form of absolute duty owing to all within the range of its humanitarian
policy.
Id. at 98.
17. Id. at 96-97.
18. Id. at 99.
19. See Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 103 (1944); The H; A.
Scandrett, 87 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1937).
20. See Pope & Talbot v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 416 (1954) (dissenting opinion).
21. NORRIS, MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES § 15 (1959).
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exposed, to ascertain the cause of their injury and to prove it in
court.
2 2
The court of appeals in reversing the decision of the district court in
Gutierrez pointed out that the Supreme Court has strayed further and further
from the original purposes of the doctrine of unseaworthiness in its decisions
after Sieracki.23 In the Supreme Court Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting in
Gutierrez, stated that the case marked "another substantial stride toward the
development by this Court of a doctrine that a shipowner is an insurer for
those who perform any work on or around a ship subject to maritime juris-
diction." 24 The extension of the doctrine to longshoremen because they are
doing "work traditionally done by seamen" loses sight of the fact that the
doctrine did not originally develop with the loading and unloading of the
vessel in mind-such tasks and their accompanying hazards were only inci-
dental. The doctrine was primarily concerned with the perils of the sea, which
sailors were bound to face under special rules of discipline (applicable to
seamen even in loading and unloading operations).
It does not seem that necessity dictates the extension of the doctrine
of unseaworthiness to longshoremen and other land based harbor workers.
25
Congress has provided the harbor worker with essentially the same remedies
for personal injuries suffered that workers engaged in the other major
shipping industries enjoy.2 6 Furthermore, the harbor worker has his common-
law remedy as a business invitee against the shipowner, if he can prove the
latter's negligence.
2 7
22. 328 U.S. at 103. Mr. Justice Jackson in his dissenting opinion in Pope & Talbot
v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1954) also summarized the reasons for not allowing harbor
workers to recover under the doctrine of unseaworthiness. Id. at 416.
23. 301 F.2d at 417. The court stated:
But it seems to us that to extend such protection disregards the whole origin and
purpose of the doctrine of unseaworthiness. True, such a worker may be broadly
argued to be in the service of the ship. But not even in a technical sense was he
or or about to go "on a voyage." . . . His dangers were not the same ....
'We see no difference to a land employee in sourse, cause, risk, or effect between
beans spilled on a dock, or on a trucking platform, or on a warehouse floor in
Denver.
24. 373 U.S. at 216.
25. See Berryhill v. Pacific Far East Line, 238 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1956). The
court expressed reluctance to extend further the rights of harbor workers: "If there exists
a social need for such an extension (which we doubt in view of existing remedies) it is
a matter for Congressional enactment, and not for this court to bring about, through judicial
legislation." Id. at 388. The court also said: "The courts have recognized the distinction
between the protection required by a seaman, and one who works on a ship cradled on dry
land. The very reason for the rule of absolute liability ends ...when the vessel is not
on water." Id. at 387.
It is submitted that there is no difference between a vessel made fast to the dock
for unloading purposes and one cradled for minor maintenance purposes.
26. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers Compensation Act, 44 Stat. 1424 (1927),
33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1959).
27. Berryhill v. Pacific Far East Line, 238 F.2d 385, 388 (9th Cir. 1956) (dictum),
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The strongest argument in the harbor workers' favor does not seem to
lie in the Sieracki rationale that they are doing the work formerly done by
seamen. Because of the policy background of the doctrine it would seem that
its extension should be based on the hazards which are encountered by harbor
workers in the performance of their occupations. These hazards arise mainly
from defective hull, gear, equipment, and cargo, owned and maintained by the
shipowner, whose officers because of their permanent association with the
vessel are familiar with and better able to guard against the ship's dangers
than the longshoremen, who work for relatively short periods of time, accepting
what is furnished.28 The strength of this consideration may account for the
long line of cases granting harbor workers the seamen's remedy.2 9
Since the remedy was given to longshoremen, the lower federal courts have
been engulfed in a state of confusion as to who should be entitled to the
remedy and under what circumstances.8 0 In Sieracki the Supreme Court set
forth a test to be utilized in determining the scope of the doctrine. The Court
stated that all who perform the work "traditionally done by the crew" 3' or
who labor in the "ship's service" 2 are entitled to the protection offered by
the doctrine. In Pope & Talbot v. Cordray, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit said that anyone injured while in the ship's service was within the scope
of the doctrine of unseaworthiness whether or not on board the vessel at
the time the injury occurred.3 3 In Hagen v. Ellerman & Bucknall S.S. Co. the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit emphasized that the situs of the injury
was not controlling; what was important was the character of the work
performed by the plaintiff.3 4 In 1959 the Supreme Court decided the case of
United Sandy Hook Pilots Ass'n v. Halecki.3 5 While a pilot boat was being
overhauled by a contractor at a shipyard in New Jersey, two employees of a
specialized subcontractor went aboard to clean the generators with carbon
tetrachloride, a task which would be performed only when there was no one
28. Address by Robert K. Klonski, Tenth Annual Convention of the National Asso-
ciation of Claimants' Compensation Attorneys, Aug. 2, 1956.
29. See Pope & Talbot v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1954); Seas Shipping Co. v.
Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946) ; O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S.
36 (1943) ; Internat'l Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) ; Pope & Talbot
v. Cordray, 258 F.2d 214 (9th Cir. 1958); Hagans v. Farrel-Lines, 237 F.2d 477 (3d
Cir. 1956) ; Strika v. Netherlands Ministry of Traffic, 185 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1950)
Robillard v. A. L. Burbank & Co., 186 F. Supp. 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
30. Note, 76 HARV. L. REV. 819 (1963).
31. 328 U.S. at 96.
32. Id. at 97.
33. 258 F.2d 214, 218 (9th Cir. 1958) (dictum). In this case a stevedore was
coordinating the unloading of the cargo from the ship's hold to its place of rest on the
dock. While most of his work was done on the dock he was injured aboard ship.
34. 196 F. Supp. 593 (E.D. Pa. 1961) ; see also Pope & Talbot v. Hawn, 346
U.S. 406, 413 (1954).
35. 358 U.S. 613 (1959).
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else on board the ship and which required the use of special equipment and
special safety precautions. Though all precautions were taken one of the men
died of carbon tetrachloride poisoning. Mr. Justice Stewart, speaking for the
majority of the Court, stated:
The work that he did was in no way "the type of work" traditionally
done by the ship's crew. It was work that could not even be per-
formed upon a ship ready for sea, but only when the ship was "dead"
with its generators dismantled. Moreover, it was the work of a
specialist, requiring special skill and special equipment . . . all
brought aboard the vessel for this special purpose, and not con-
nected with a ship's seagoing operations. . . .-6 The decedent was
not doing what any crew member had ever done on this ship or
anywhere else in the world so far as we are informed.
3 7
In Halecki the Court's language indicated that the work must have been
performed by some member of a ship's crew at some time before that type
of work is to be considered to be the traditional work of the crew. If this
is the proper test to determine who is performing a ship's service a shipowner
with a modern ship who contracts out work on his modern equipment is given
a definite advantage over the shipowner whose equipment is older and has
been worked on at some time by a crew member.
3 8
The cases indicate that the ship's service test does not furnish them with
enough guidance. A number of cases can be questioned in light of the test
the courts purport to apply.8 9 Sometimes application of the test is made even
more difficult, because the court is confronted with the question of whether
a ship is in or out of navigation.40 It would appear from unseaworthiness cases
1
36. Though this language apparently has some significance in the application of the
test, the Court does not make clear what it has in mind.
37. 358 U.S. at 617.
38. See United Sandy Hook Pilots Ass'n v. Halecki, 358 U.S. 613, 624 (1959).
The dissent in Halecki suggests that the test may be unfair: "today's shipowner escapes
his absolute duty because his vessel is modern and outfitted with complicated and
dangerous equipment; and because a pattern of contracting out a sort of work on it
has become established."
39. See Fematt v. Nedlloyed Line, 191 F. Supp. 907 (S.D. Cal. 1961). A linesman,
assisting in the docking of a vessel, who was injured when a forward spring line broke,
received the protection of the unseaworthiness doctrine. The service of a linesman,
assisting in either the docking or undocking of a vessel, was never "traditionally or
historically" performed by a member of the ship's crew. During the days of sailing vessels
the linesmen, who were known as boatmen, rowed out from shore to meet the ship and
catch the land lines. The boatmen were usually employed by the ship's agent or husband,
and in many instances were volunteers. And see Merrill v. The S.S. Cuaco, 189 F. Supp.
321 (D. Ore. 1960) (longshoreman lining tanks for grain performing ship's business-
carrying cargo); Casbon v. Stockard S.S. Co., 173 F. Supp. 845 (E.D. La. 1959)
(carpenter building firewall in hold doing seaman's work).
40. See West v. United States, 361 U.S. 118 (1960). A repairman was injured on
a vessel undergoing repairs after she had been removed from storage in a "mothball
fleet." The purpose behind putting the vessel in the repair yard was to make her sea-
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that no objective standard has been formulated which can be utilized in deter-
mining whether or not a certain type of work was traditionally performed by
the crew.41 The cases, including Gutierrez, are not too informative as to what is
traditional work, merely concluding that a particular plaintiff was so engaged.
One wonders whether the test is that type of work done by the crew in
the days of wooden sailing ships or in more modern times. It hardly appears
likely that we are to be guided by the sail sewing, oakum, and tar activities
of sailors before the mast. However, it should be noted that this period has
been referred to in determining whether an activity was traditionally per-
formed by seamen. 42 Consideration of the work aboard steamships in the
decade of 1910-1920 should be fair and informative, for that decade covers,a
time when much of ship maintenance and repair work was not farmed out
to contractors; and this period is within the memory of living witnesses who
saw crews work aboard ship.
48
It does not appear from the Gutierrez decision that the Supreme Court
has added much to the test laid down in Sieracki for determining the scope of
the doctrine. There is language in the opinion which may indicate the current
position of the Court: the shipowner's duty extends "to seamen or their
substitutes on or about the ship.' '44 Possibly the Court is satisfied with the
traditional work-of-seamen test set up in Sieracki, which means that the Court
will continue to scrutinize the test as it is applied by the lower federal courts,
allowing certiorari where a new work situation creates a serious question as
to whether the class of workers who perform that type of work are doing the
work traditionally done by seamen. The trend as shown by the Supreme
Court's decisions in the last fifteen years has been to place a much greater
burden on the shipowner for the safety of persons working on or about his
vessel.
45
The ship's service test implicitly denies, however, the protection of the
worthy. It would be unfair to say that the owner held the vessel out as seaworthy in this
situation. To determine whether a vessel is in navigation the focus should be upon the
status of the ship, the nature of the repairs, and their extensiveness. In Latus v. United
States, 277 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1960) the court concluded that while a ship is withdrawn
from navigation for reconditioning, she does not warrant her seaworthiness to those
who work aboard her. In Lawlor v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 275 F.2d 599 (2d Cir.
1960) a vessel was taken to drydock and then to dockside in navigable.waters for repairs
not involving structural changes. The court found the repairmen to be doing work
traditionally done by seamen. The following criteria were applied to decide whether the
vessel was in navigation: the character of the work to be done by the shipyard, the
presence or absence of a crew performing the customary work of seamen on shipboard,
and the measure of control by the shipyard over the vessel as a whole. Id. at 604.
41. See Thompson v. Calmar S.S. Co., 216 F. Supp. 236, 237 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
42. Fematt v. Nedlloyd Line, 191 F. Supp. 907 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
43. NORRIS, MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES § 48A (1959).
44. 373 U.S. at 213. (Emphasis added.)
45. Id. at 216 (dictum).
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doctrine of unseaworthiness to a class of persons more in need of it and
from a historical standpoint more entitled to it-passengers. 46 Passengers on
a vessel, although not engaged in serving the ship, are subjected to the same
perils of the sea faced by seamen. They must utilize the facilities of the ship
just as a crew member must. A passenger may be wholly inexperienced with
the sea and particularly vulnerable to an unseaworthy condition. If a pas-
senger were injured by some unseaworthy condition and a seaman standing
beside him were injured by the same force, it would seem that only the
seaman could avail himself of the doctrine of unseaworthiness.
Before the scope of the doctrine of unseaworthiness can be determined
the Supreme Court will have to clarify what work is to be considered work
traditionally performed by the crew.47 The trend of the Court's decisions
definitely points to a liberal treatment of the doctrine in the future. Eventually,
it is conceivable that the Court will extend the doctrine to anyone injured by
a vessel's unseaworthy condition.
ARTHUR INDEN
46. See Ludena v. The Santa Luisa, 121 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (dictum).
Although this case held that no unseaworthy condition existed, the court seemed to
feel that the doctrine would be applicable to a passenger. But see Kermarec v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959) ; Talton v. United States Lines Co., 203
F. Supp. 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Gardner v. Panama Canal Co., 115 F. Supp. 687 (D.C.Z.
1953).
47. See Talton v. United States Lines Co., supra note 46; Gardner v. Panama
Canal Co., supra note 46.
STATE COURT PROTECTION OF COPYRIGHTED
MATERIAL FROM UNFAIR COMPETITION*
The recent Pennsylvania case of Pottstown Daily News Pub. Co. v.
Pottstown Broadcasting Co., may have enlarged the scope of protection
afforded literary property by the law of unfair competition. The defendant
radio station had misappropriated local news items which appeared in the
plaintiff's newspaper and had used the pirated material in its news broad-
casts a short time after publication. The newspaper brought an action for
unfair competition in the state court alleging a copyright in the news
gathered by its staff.
The defendant contended first that by alleging a federal copyright the
plaintiff elected to proceed in the federal courts on the theory that section 1338
of the 1948 Revision of the Judicial Code 2 vested exclusive jurisdiction in
the district court for any action arising under the Copyright Act.3 Defendant
further urged that equity had no jurisdiction on the theory that equity had
no "property" to protect, because plaintiff had released his property rights
by complying with the publication requirement of the Copyright Act.4 (An
action for unfair competition is usually brought in equity because monetary
damages are difficult to assess and standing alone they provide an inadequate
remedy if the defendant's unfair acts continue.) Two jurisdictional issues were
thus presented to the court for its determination: (1) Does a state court
have jurisdiction when the subject matter of the suit is copyrighted? (2) Is
copyrighted material a proper subject of equitable protection?
In dealing with the first issue the court noted that unfair competition
is traditionally a common-law action cognizable in the state courts, and that
states will not be held divested of jurisdiction by a federal statute unless the con-
gressional intent to that effect clearly appears. The court concluded that the
defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction must be denied on the
first ground because a proper reading of the statute discloses that the plain-
tiff is left with a choice. He may base his action on unfair competition and
proceed in a state court even though the subject matter of the suit is copy-
righted, or bring suit in a federal court for copyright infringement and depend
* Entered in the Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition.
1. 411 Pa. 383, 192 A.2d 657 (1963).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1958). The statute provides:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising
under any Act of Congress relating to patents, copyrights or trademarks. Such
jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in patent and copyright
cases.
(b) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action assert-
ing a claim of unfair competition when joined with a substantial and related
claim under the copyright, patent or trademark laws.
3. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-217 (1958).
4. 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1958).
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on section 1338(b) to give the court jurisdiction to consider the nonfederal
claim of unfair competition.
The statute construed by the court is a codification of the doctrine set
forth in Hurn v. Oursler.5 In that case plaintiff was attempting to recover in
a federal court for infringement of his copyrighted dramatic composition.
Defendant had allegedly incorporated in his composition one of plaintiff's
ideas. Plaintiff alleged unfair competition and a copyright claim. Finding
no infringement the lower court dismissed the copyright claim and refused
jurisdiction of the unfair competition claim because no federal question was
presented. On appeal the United States Supreme Court decided that the unfair
competition claim could be retained even after the copyright claim was found
to be without merit. The Supreme Court drew a fine distinction between cases
where two separate causes of action are presented, only one of which is federal
in character, and where there exists but one cause of action supported by
two different grounds. In the latter case, assuming that one of the two grounds
is federal in nature, the district court may take jurisdiction over the other.
This doctrine, known as "pendent jurisdiction," was codified in section 1338.
The statute provides that jurisdiction over the unfair competition claim
shall only be assumed when it is "joined with a substantial and related claim
under the copyright . . . laws."6 The courts have given meaning to the words
"substantial" and "related." In American Security Co. v. Shatterproof Glass
Corp.,7 a suit for patent infringement and unfair competition, the "substantial"
test was set forth. A copyright claim is without substance if "obviously with-
out merit or its unsoundness clearly results from previous decisions of the
Supreme Court."" If it is clear that the plaintiff is "not really relying upon the
patent or copyright law for his alleged rights then the claim does not really
and substantially involve a controversy within the jurisdiction of the court."9
A claim is "related" when it "refers to one which may be proved by sub-
stantially the same facts."10
It is conceivable that some unfair competition claims may be based on
copyrighted material. The Pottstown court held that as long as the claim is
based principally on unfair competition and not on copyright infringement,
section 1338(a) will not operate to confer exclusive jurisdiction on the
federal court because the action does not "arise under" the Copyright Act.
This has been termed the Hum doctrine in reverse. 1 Instead of allowing unfair
5. 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1958).
7. 166 F. Supp. 813 (D. Del. 1958).
8. Id. at 824.
9. Ibid.
10. O'Brien v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 293 F.2d 1, 12 (1961).
11. 4 CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS § 91.2(a) (2d ed. 1950).
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competition to ride into the federal courts on the coattails of copyrighted
material, the copyrighted material can be introduced into the state court and
protected by the law of unfair competition. This rationale appears to
recognize the fact that the purpose of section 1338(b) was to prevent "piece-
meal litigation,' 1 2 forcing the plaintiff to bring two actions where one would
suffice. This aim is achieved as well by state consideration of related claims,
as by federal.
The Hurn doctrine in reverse does not appear for the first time in the
Pottstown case. In a decision by the Supreme Court of Florida 8 the state
court was not divested of jurisdiction where the plaintiff asserted a patent
claim in an action for unfair competition. Plaintiff had manufactured and
patented a mobile carousel and charged that defendants, former employees,
had misappropriated his molds and produced carousels in competition with
him. Defendant's motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction was denied.
The patentee may elect to waive the right to sue in a federal court for
infringement of his patent and may, instead, proceed in a state court
to enforce some right protected by and enforceable under general
common-law and equitable principles applicable in such state.'
4
The court distinguished between cases where the action is brought mainly
under the federal law and those where the primary concern is unfair competi-
tion.15 The mere alleging of a copyright or patent in an action for unfair
competition is not viewed by the state courts as an action "arising under"
the copyright or patent laws.
Aside from the fact that if his claim is not held "substantial and related"
the plaintiff must begin his action anew in a state court, 16 there are disad-
vantages to the action for copyright infringement. The Copyright Act estab-
lishes maximum damages recoverable upon a finding of infringement."
Greater damages are generally available in an action for unfair competition.
The Copyright Act extends coverage to "periodicals, including newspapers,"',,
but protection of everything contained in the newspaper is by no means
assured. A copyright may be obtained by following certain filing and publica-
tion requirements set out by the statute' 9 for those materials which are copy-
12. Revisers' Notes to 1948 Revision of Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1958).
13. Bert Lane Co. v. Internat'l Indus. Inc., 84 So. 2d 5 (1955).
14. Id. at 7.
15. Accord, Thai v. Polumbaum, 196 Misc. 897, 96 N.Y.S.2d 226 (1949) ; Miroflector
Co. v. Kline, 283 App. Div. 1097, 131 N.Y.S.2d 814 (1954).
16. General Radio Co. v. Superior Elec. Co., 293 F.2d 949 (1949).
17. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1958).
18. 17 U.S.C. § 5(b) (1958).
19. 17 U.S.C. §§ 10, 13 (1958).
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rightable ;20 however, the plaintiff may initiate a copyright infringement action
only to discover that his work product was not copyrightable.
There appears to be some doubt as to whether local news items, such as were
the subject matter of the Pottstown case, can be copyrighted. Mere ideas will
not sustain a copyright ;21 they are part of the public domain, available for
anyone. Similarly, news per se may not be copyrighted.2 2 The events which are
made the subjects of news stories may not be monopolized. Competition in the
gathering of news fosters a wider dissemination thereof and results in a better
informed public. The Copyright Act is directed instead toward the protection
of a particular manner of expression of news.
23
The purpose of the original English Copyright Act2 4 as well as the one
in force in the United States is elucidated in our Constitution: "To promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their Respective Writings .... -25
Before the English statute an author was granted unlimited protection of
the property rights inherent in his work.2 6 This was found to work a detri-
ment to the cultural progress of the country by preventing wide dissemination
of the writings through lawful copying. It was felt that a limited and controlled
statutory monopoly would sufficiently guarantee financial gain to stimulate the
production of creative works. This guarantee is not, however, the fundamental
purpose in the protection of literary property under the copyright law. The
desired end is promotion of the useful arts and sciences.
A certain degree of literary quality is required to warrant protection by
the Copyright Act.27 It is virtually impossible to define "literary quality," but
several courts have attempted the task. In National Tel. News Co. v. Western
Union Tel. Co. 2 1 the court reflected on the problem.
It would be both inequitable and impracticable to give copyright
protection to every printed article. Much of current publication-in
fact the greater portion-is nothing beyond the mere notation of
events transpiring, which, if transpiring at all, are accessible by all.
It is inconceivable that the copyright grant of the Constitution, and
the statutes in pursuance thereof, were meant to give a monopoly of
narrative to him, who, putting the bare recital of events in print, went
through the routine formulae of the copyright statutes.
20. 17 U.S.C. § 3 (1958) ; see also Tribune Co. of Chicago v. Associated Press, 116
Fed. 126 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1900).
21. Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82 (1899).
22. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234 (1918).
23. Ibid.
24. 8 Ann. c. 19 (1710).
25. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
26. Donaldsons v. Becket, 4 Burrows 2408, 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (K.B. 1774).




It would be difficult to define, comprehensively, what character
of writing is copyrightable, and what is not. But, for the purposes
of this case, we may fix the confines at the point where authorship
proper ends and mere annals begin.
29
Local news items are often written in the "who, what, when, where" style
which sacrifices literary quality for conciseness, and places the work closer
to the "annals" level on the literary scale. Some intellectual addition emanating
from the writer's own mind must be apparent to merit copyright protection. 0
In Inter-City Press, Inc. v. Siegfried,31 a recent Missouri case, the criterion
set forth was the presence of "distinguishable variations in the arrangement
and manner of presentation which bespeaks of expression peculiar to author-
ship."'3 2 The bass score of a musical composition was held to be uncopy-
rightable in Shapiro, Bernstein & Co.' v. Miracle Record Co.33 The court
commented that "it is a mechanical application of a simple harmonious chord;
and that the purpose of the copyright law is to protect creation, not mechanical
skill."'3 4 Such cases imply that sheer industry is not a valid reason for
copyright protection. If the basic purpose of the Copyright Act is to prevail,
its protection will be refused to a writing devoid of literary quality.
But on the other side of the copyrightability issue there are the cases
which expand copyright protection to cover "quasi-artistic" works. The
"directory cases" will offer support for a finding that local news items are
copyrightable. It was held in Jeweler's Circular Pub. Co. v. Keystone Pub.
Co.3 5 that a directory of jewelers' trademarks compiled and sold to jewelers
by plaintiff was copyrightable even if the trademarks themselves were not a
proper subject for copyright.
The right to copyright a book upon which one has expended effort
in its preparation does not depend upon whether the material he has
collected consist or not of matters which are publici juris, or whether
such materials show literary skill or originality, either in thought or
language, or anything more than industrious collection. The man
who goes through the streets of a town and puts down the names of
each of the inhabitants, with their occupations and their street
numbers, acquires material of which he is the author. He produces
by his labor a meritorious composition in which he may obtain a
29. Id. at 297.
30. Ibid.
31. 172 F. Supp. 37 (W.D. Mo. 1958).
32. Id. at 41.
33. 91 F. Supp. 473 (N.D. Ill. 1950).
34. Id. at 474-75. But see Consolidated Music Publishers, Inc. v. Ashley Publica-
tions, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), where it was held that musical compositions
with a "modicum of creativity" or a "mere trivial variation" may be copyrighted.
35. 281 Fed. 83 (2d Cir. 1922).
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copyright, and thus obtain the exclusive right of multiplying copies
of his work. 36
The conclusion of copyrightability in the case of directories was drawn from
a series of English cases which attempted to bolster the weak areas in the
English unfair competition law.3 7 The English decisions were followed in
the United States by cases decided prior to the 1918 expansion of unfair
competition to include protection against the misappropriation of the fruits
of another's labor.38 Hartford Printing Co. v. Hartford Directory and Pub.
Co.,39 an action for copyright infringement, clearly was decided on the yet
unannounced doctrine of misappropriation twelve years before the controver-
sial leading case, International News Serv. v. Associated Press.40 The
Hartford court expressed some doubt about the basis for its holding:
The plaintiff invokes the law because he was the owner, proprietor
and compiler of a book. In so far as he may have used his brains to
get up an artistic book in the way of grouping, classifying and setting
forth the facts which it contains, there would be reason in his claim;
but in so far as he merely records accurately the names of residents,
with their occupations, and where to find them at home and in busi-
ness, it is impossible to discover wherein the useful arts and sciences
are promoted. The labor involved therein is purely mechanical and
to protect the copyright affords a certain measure of monopoly in the
right to make such a use of labor and money. Copyrights upon
directories have, however, been cared for by the courts so many
times that it would be presumptious for me, without solicitation,
to attempt a practical expression of my own views. The complain-
ant's lawful copyright is therefore assumed, and sternly repressing
such tendencies as these suggestions would lead us toward, it will
be my purpose to decide the matter upon the case presented ...
[S]uch sales were nevertheless injurious to the complainant, be-
cause defendant availed himself of the labor expended by complain-
ant on the copyright, and has, by such unfair use, lessened his own
labor.4
1
The essence of copyrightability in the case of directories is the industry
expended in collecting and arranging facts which are drawn from the public
domain. The same reasoning has been extended to works other than di-
rectories. In Gelles-Widmer Co. v. Milton Bradley Co.42 defendant had
36. Id. at 88. (Emphasis added.)
37. E.g., Walters v. Lane, [1900] A.C. 539; Kelley v. Morris, [18661 1 Eq. 696.
38. See, e.g., International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
39. 146 Fed. 332 (D.C. Conn. 1906).
40. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
41. 146 Fed. at 333.
42. 313 F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1963).
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copied educational flash cards manufactured by plaintiff. The court held
that the cards were sufficiently original to sustain a copyright even if they
utilized commonly known arithmetical combinations. The manner of con-
structing elements in the public domain was again held to result in copy-
rightability.
43
On the one side, then, rest the cases which hold that works devoid
of literary quality will not be subject to copyright protection, because the
useful arts are not thereby promoted. However, the directory cases seem
to hold that no more than industrious collection and repetition of facts is
required for a meritorious copyright. Until this conflict is resolved a plaintiff's
uncertainty as to whether his property was protected by copyright will deter
him from use of the federal courts and encourage him to seek state protection
of copyrighted material through an action for unfair competition.
By far the best theoretical argument in favor of the Hurn doctrine in
reverse lies in the basic differences in the interests secured by the Copyright
Act on the one hand and the law of unfair competition on the other. These
differences serve to point up the characteristics of the newspaper publishing
enterprise which relate it more closely to the unfair competiton action than
to a claim for copyright infringement. Unfair competition has been styled
by various courts as the protection of-"quasi-property" in the product of
a business -44 rights in the expenditure of labor, time or money ;45 the business
goodwill ;46 and the business itself.47 The courts have based relief onl prevention
of fraud on the public, 48 unjust enrichment,49 and promotion of fair dealing in
business.5 0 Unfair competition had its origin in the ancient trademark law
of England.5 1 It later became apparent that the true generic term was unfair
competition, trademark law being but a small part thereof.5 2 A trademark is
the exclusive right to use a name, word, or symbol designating certain goods
as those of the one claiming the right. '3 The trademark law is directed
toward preventing a competitor from "passing off" his inferior wares as those
of the trademark proprietor. In this way the business of the proprietor is
43. But see Surgical Supply Service, Inc. v. Adler, 206 F. Supp. 564 (E.D. Pa. 1962),
where the alphabetical arrangement of a price list was insufficient for copyright.
44. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
45. Pottstown Daily News Pub. Co. v. Pottstown Broadcasting Co., 411 Pa. 383,
192 A.2d 657 (1963).
46. Allen & Wheeler Co. v. Hanover Star Milling Co., 240 U.S. 403 (1916).
47. American Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 Fed. 281 (6th Cir. 1900).
48. Collins v. Parst, 14 F.2d 614 (E.D. Pa. 1926).
49. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
50. Philadelphia Dairy Products v. Quaker City Ice Cream Co., 306 Pa. 164, 159
Atl. 3 (1932).
51. 1 CALLMAN, op. cit. supra note 11, § 4.1.
52. Ibid.
53. 1 NIms, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS § 198(a) (4th ed. 1947).
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secured from unfair attack by one who seeks to misappropriate the fruits of
honest labor by a merchant who has built a reputation for his goods. In
this respect the interests secured by both unfair competition and trademark
are identical. 54 This interest can only be the right to have a lawful business
protected from acts of a competitor which are considered unfair because the
competitor in some way utilizes for his own benefit the honest toil of another.
There was little overlap between the law of unfair competition and
copyright infringement until the production and marketing of literary works
became a vast source of business profit. The literary quality of the writings
seems to have diminished as the rate of production has increased. The sensa-
tional tabloids on the newsstands today give vociferous support to the proposi-
tion that quality has been sacrificed for quantity. As the business interests
in literary production have expanded to overshadow its artistic aspects, so
the law of unfair competition has expanded to overshadow the copyright laws.
When, as in the Pottstown case, the plaintiff is interested primarily
in the protection of a business, the fact that the subject matter of the business
is copyrighted should not draw the controversy inexorably into the federal
domain to the exclusion of state court action.
The second issue presented to the Pottstown court was whether property
rights are retained in copyrighted material sufficient to warrant their enforce-
ment in equity. It is an ancient rule that equity acts only on property rights. 55
The court decided that as against the broadcasting company the newspaper
retained enough rights in the "pirated" material to prevent its unfair use
by a competitor. To arrive at this conclusion the court circumvented the
rule that property rights are lost upon publication by declaring that here there
remained a "limited property right."56 The newspaper was published only
with regard to use by the general public for noncompetitive purposes. This
holding creates an interesting legal paradox. The federal statute requires
unqualified "publication" for a valid copyright.
57
The position taken by the court is in line with equity's traditional search
for property rights, which seems to have had its origin in 1818 in Gee v.
Pritchard.5 8 In that case Lord Eldon decided the writer of personal letters
retained sufficient property to gain an injunction against publication by the
recipient without the permission of the writer. The Lord Chancellor's
reasoning was that although the letters constituted a gift to defendant, the gift
was a qualified one. Defendant could do anything but disclose the contents
of the letters to the world. Because of its breach of confidence aspect the
54. Ibid.
55. Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swanst. 402, 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (Ch. 1818).
56. 411 Pa. at 393, 192 A.2d at 663.
57. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1958).
58. 2 Swanst. 402, 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (Ch. 1818).
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case is considered the first recognition of the right to privacy. 59 As a protection
of privacy the decision seems both just and rational. It would be difficult
to say that the letters were published when dispatched. Here is an excellent
example of a "limited publication." Publication was intended by the writer
only as to the recipient. The case may indicate that property rights inherent
in literary works at common-law are not lost when the writing is com-
municated to one individual in confidence.
But when the rationale is applied to the unfair competition situation
it becomes more difficult to see how any property rights are retained. Exactly
one hundred years later in 1918 the case of International News Serv. v.
Associated Press60 was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States.
Defendant was pirating uncopyrighted news items which plaintiff had dis-
tributed to its eastern subscribers for publication. After publication defendant
extracted the material and sent it to its own newspapers in the West. Mr.
Justice Pitney, speaking for the majority, appeared to disregard common-law
copyright 61 in his search for property rights when he said:
We need spend no time, however, upon the general question of
property in news matter at common-law, or the application of the
Copyright Act, since it seems to us the case must turn upon the
question of unfair competition in business. And, in our opinion, this
does not depend upon any general right of property analogous to the
common law right of the proprietor of an unpublished work to pre-
vent its publication without his consent . . . . What we are con-
cerned with is the business of making it known to the world, in which
both parties to the present suit are engaged.
62
He then proceeded to find an existing property right after publication because
the publication was of a limited type.
The contention that the news is abandoned to the public for all
purposes when published in the first newspaper is untenable. Aban-
donment is a question of intent, and the entire organization of the
Associated Press negatives such a purpose . . . . [P]ublication by
each member must be deemed not by any means an abandon-
ment of the news to the world for any and all purposes,
but a publication for limited purposes; for the benefit of the
59. Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality, 29
HARV. L. REV. 640 (1916).
60. 248 U.S. 215.
61. Common-law property rights in literary works are lost upon publication.
Jeweler's Mercantile Agency v. Jeweler's Weekly Pub. Co., 155 N.Y. 241, 49 N.E. 872
(1898). The literary property rights inherent in every writing compose the common-law
copyright, or the exclusive right to the first publication. 2 NIMs, op. cit. supra note 53,
§ 271(a). When the work is published it is dedicated to the public, and these rights are
dispersed into the public domain.
62. 248 U.S. at 234-35.
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readers of the bulletin or newspaper as such; not for the purpose
of making merchandise of it as news, with the result of depriving
complainant's . . . members of their reasonable opportunity to obtain
just returns for their expenditure.6
In Pennsylvania the International News Service case was followed in
Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc.6 4 Here, as in the Pottstown
case, a radio station was the "pirate." Plaintiff Fred Waring had made record-
ings of his orchestral interpretations of musical selections for sale to the public.
On each recording was printed the legend, "Not Licensed for Radio Broad-
cast." Defendant had obtained a license to broadcast the songs from
the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers to whom
both composer and publisher had assigned the exclusive right of public
performance under their copyrights. Waring's renditions were not and could
not be copyrighted under the federal statute. In short, defendant's license
permitted broadcast of the songs, but not Waring's interpretations thereof.
The court held that Waring had acquired literary property rights by
application of his musical talent. This was sufficient to give him a common-law
copyright in the renditions. Again a limited publication was found.
In line with the Associated Press Case, the "publication" of the
orchestra's renditions was a dedication of the records on phono-
graphs, and not to competitive interests to profit therefrom at plain-
tiff's expense. 5
Having found the necessary property right by straining the doctrines of
common-law copyright the court granted relief on grounds of unfair competi-
tion. The Pottstown decision drew from both the International News Service
and Waring cases the proposition that property rights remain in a literary
work after publication.
66
If the law of unfair competition in general and the law of trademark
protection both protect the same essential interest of the businessman, the
right not to share his business without remuneration, and the trademark
has been held to secure a right of property,67 it is difficult to see why the
property rights so diligently sought by equity cannot more easily be found.
There seems to be no need to require literary property rights, or rights
having to do with the nature of the product. The trademark rights do not
disappear when the goods are shown to the world. Possibly the protection of
trademark rights would indicate a basis for equitable protection in other
unfair competition situations.
63. Id. at 240-41.
64. 327 Pa. 433, 194 AtI. 631 (1937).
65. Id. at 453.
66. 411 Pa. at 392, 192 A.2d at 663.
67. 1 Nits, op. cit. supra note 53, § 198(a).
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A few courts have managed to transcend the property rights requirement
in equity. In granting an injunction against exclusion of plaintiff from mem-
bership in the National Women's Party, one court flatly rejected the ancient
doctrine.
The doctrine that equity jurisdiction is limited to the protection of
property rights conflicts with the familiar principle that equity may
give preventative relief when the legal remedy of money damages, if
available at all, is inadequate to redress a wrong. Obviously money
has little in common with such personal rights or interests as reputa-
tion, domestic relations, or membership in nonprofit organizations.
Money, one form of property, has much more in common with other
forms of property. Invasions of personal interests are accordingly
less capable of translation into money terms than invasions of prop-
erty interests. No one can seriously contend that money is an ade-
quate remedy for all sorts of personal wrongs. 68
The Pennsylvania supreme court has enforced civil rights in equity
without regard to any property rights. In Everett v. Harron69 the court
enjoined the defendant swimming club from barring the admission of plain-
tiff, a Negro. This case was followed in Lackey v. Sacoolas,70 which presented
essentially the same fact situation. The Lackey case was a recent case decided
by the same court which handed down the Pottstown decision. If the Penn-
sylvania courts enforce civil rights in equity, there would seem to be no
valid reason for insistence on a property right in an unfair competition action.
Business rights even if not "property" seem as worthy of protection to the
businessman as are civil rights to the Negro and social rights to the club-
woman.
In conclusion then, the mere allegation of a copyright should not auto-
matically operate to bring the plaintiff within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
federal courts when his primary aim is only to protect his investment of time,
effort, and money in a business. This is especially so where the publication
sought to be protected is of questionable literary quality; the Copyright Act
was intended to guard artistic writings. Directories, for example, should not
be copyrightable, in light of the extension of unfair competition beyond
the "passing-off" situation.
The need to declare a "limited" publication where copyrighted material
is sought to be protected by an unfair competition action seems illogical. The
material is unqualifiedly published if validly copyrighted, but at the same time
it is held not to be published as far as competitors are concerned. This situation
68. Berrien v. Pollitzer, 165 F.2d 21, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1947) ; see also Kenyon v. City
of Chicopee, 320 Mass. 528, 70 N.E.2d 241 (1946).
69. 380 Pa. 123, 110 A.2d 383 (1955).
70. 411 Pa. 235, 191 A.2d 395 (1963).
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is created by the requirement that there be a property right in the material.
Business interests could be protected on other theories.
The Pottstown result appears sound. The reverse application of the Hurn
doctrine, permitting this plaintiff to elect for practical reasons to bring his
action in the state court, seems appropriate in the present case. But the
reasoning that the court felt was necessary to justify the exercise of equitable
jurisdiction is not wholly satisfactory.
WALTER K. SWARTZKOPF, JR.
DUE PROCESS AND INVOLUNTARY EXPATRIATION OF
NATURALIZED CITIZENS FOR CONTINUOUS
FOREIGN RESIDENCE
Angelika L. Schneider, a naturalized citizen of the United States, was
declared by the State Department to have lost her citizenship when she violated
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 by residing for more than three
years in the foreign state of her birth.' Schneider v. Rusk2 was an action
before a three-judge district court to set aside the action of the State Depart-
ment and declare her a citizen. The plaintiff contended that the statutory
provisions applied to her were discriminatory and violative of due process,
because naturalized citizens may be expatriated for continuous foreign res-
idence, while native-born citizens may reside abroad indefinitely without loss
of citizenship. The court held that involuntary expatriation of naturalized
citizens for continuous foreign residence does not violate the requirements
of due process and that the classification imposed by the statute has a rational
basis and is reasonably related to the legislative purposes.
At common law voluntary expatriation of a citizen could not be effected
even with the consent of the sovereign. 3 Partly to justify the Declaration of
Independence, this doctrine of perpetual allegiance was modified by the Amer-
ican colonies to the extent that a duty owed by a sovereign to its citizens was
recognized. 4 By 1868 the United States had expressly recognized the right of
an individual to expatriate himself, although those acts which constituted
voluntary expatriation had not been legislatively defined.5 Generally, admin-
istrative officers determined whether a transfer of allegiance had occurred.6
A statutory standard defining renunciation or abandonment of citizenship was
1. Section 352(a) (1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, relied upon
by the Government to effect the expatriation of the plaintiff, provides in pertinent part-
(a) A person who has become a national by naturalization shall lose his nation-
ality by-(l) having a continuous residence for three years in the territory
of a foreign state ... in which the place of his birth is situated. ... 66 Stat.
269 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1484(a) (1) (1958).
2. 218 F. Supp. 302 (D.D.C. 1963).
3. COCKBURN, NATIONALITY 63 (1869); Slaymaker, The Right of the American
Citizen To Expatriate, 37 Am. L. RaV. 191, 192 (1903).
4. Dutcher, The Right of Expatriation, 11 Am. L. REV. 447, 448-49 (1877).
5. Some support can be found for the right of a citizen prior to 1868 to expatriate
himself. Mr. Jefferson, Secretary of State in 1793, stated: "Our citizens are certainly free
to divest themselves of that character by emigration and other acts manifesting their intent,
and may then become citizens of another power, and are free to do whatever the subject
of that power may do." 3 MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 562 (1906). However,
express statutory authority was found in 15 Stat. 223 (1868), which provided that it was
a "natural and inherent right of all people" to divest themselves of allegiance to any
state. In general, a citizen expatriated himself by emigrating to another state with no
plain intention of returning coupled with the assumption of the obligations of a subject of
the foreign government. 3 MOORE, op. cit. supra at 711-30.
6. Id. at 562-771; Roche, The Loss of American Nationality-the Development of
Statutory Expatriation, 99 U. PA. L. REV. 25 (1950).
227
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
sought as a necessary aid to the State Department in the protection of Amer-
ican citizens abroad, particularly with regard to naturalized citizens. 7 Primarily,
the Nationality Act of 1907 codified the ways for objectively determining when
a citizen was deemed to have exercised his right to voluntarily expatriate
himself, but it also provided that a naturalized citizen residing for two years
in his country of origin or for five years in any other country would be pre-
sumed to have ceased to be an American citizen. s The State Department and
the courts treated this presumption as relevant to protection of naturalized
citizens and not as relevant to loss of citizenship. 9 Considerations of policy
and practical convenience 0 led to the adoption of the Nationality Act of 1940
which provided for automatic expatriation of naturalized citizens who reside
in their countries of origin for three years.11 That precise provision has been
incorporated into the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.12
There are dicta that the power of naturalization vested in Congress by
the Constitution is a power to confer citizenship, not a power to take citizen-
ship away. 13 Thus the power of Congress to enact legislation depriving
7. In 1906 a Citizenship Board appointed by the Secretary of State noted an increase
in the number of American citizens residing abroad and that "the question of their protec-
tion causes increasing embarrassment to this Government in its relations with foreign
powers." The Board recommended passage of a law providing that a naturalized citizen
domiciled in a foreign state for five years may be assumed to have expatriated himself.
H.R. Doc. No. 326, 59th Cong., 2d Sess. 25-27 (1906).
8. 34 Stat. 1228 (1907). The act also provided that a citizen who takes an oath of
allegiance to or is naturalized by a foreign government may be presumed to have ceased to
be an American citizen.
9. The following authorities concluded that the presumption could only be invoked
by the government against a naturalized citizen who asserted a claim to diplomatic pro-
tection of some sort: Camardo v. Tillinghast, 29 F.2d 527 (1st Cir. 1928) ; Laranjo v.
Brownell, 126 F. Supp. 370 (N.D. Cal. 1954) 116 F. Supp. 298 (D.N.J. 1954) ; United
States v. Eliasen, 11 F.2d 785 (D.D.C. 1926) ; 2 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. 504 (1910). See also
United States v. Gay, 264 U.S. 353 (1924) (semble).
10. A Committee appointed in 1933 by President Roosevelt to study the existing laws
governing nationality found them to be unsatisfactory in that "the presumption of loss of
citizenship arising under its terms never became final, regardless of the length and cause
of foreign residence." The Committee believed a provision for loss of nationalization to
be "fully warranted," especially in connection with applications "for diplomatic protection."
The Committee concluded that termination of American nationality should be automatic,
resulting directly from the fact of foreign residence by naturalized citizens since pro-
ceedings before the State Department would be a constant irritation, and proceedings in
court would be cumbersome, time consuming, and expensive. STAFF OF HouSE COMMITTEE
ON NATIONALITY, 76th CONG., 1st SESs., NATIONALITY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES
69-71 (Comm. Print 1938).
11. 54 Stat. 1170 (1940). The provision for expatriation of naturalized citizens who
reside in their countries of origin for three years was incorporated without change from
the draft code submitted by the President's Committee on Nationality, supra note 9.
12. Immigration & Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 269, 8 U.S.C. § 1484(a) (1)
(1958).
13. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 16 U.S. 649 (1898) held that a person born
in the United States could not be excluded as an alien although his parents were not
eligible for naturalization. The Court viewed the power of naturalization vested in
Congress by the Constitution as a power to confer citizenship, not a power to take
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individuals of their American citizenship has been based on attributes of
sovereignty' 4 and on the inherent power of Congress to deal with foreign
affairs.1 5 Some cases indicate that express renunciation of American allegiance
may be imputed to a citizen who voluntarily performs the proscribed statu-
tory conduct even though he does not intend to expatriate himself.'l These
cases were decided on a theory of concurrence, that is, the statutory denation-
alization was a condition voluntarily brought about by one's own acts, with
knowledge of the consequences.' 7 Recently, however, the Supreme Court did
not impute express renunciation of citizenship to one who voted in a foreign
election,' 8 or to a citizen who deserted the army, 19 or to one who remained
outside the jurisdiction of the United States in war time to avoid the draft.20
The statute providing for denationalization of a native-born citizen for
voting in a foreign election was enforced, however; the Court found a reason-
able relation between the power of Congress over the conduct of foreign
affairs and the active participation of an American citizen in foreign elec-
tions.21
Distinctions between citizens based solely on their places of birth have
been regarded as odious in a free society.22 But due process does not require
citizenship away. In an action to restrain a state officer from enforcing a statute taxing
the Bank of the United States, Marshall, Ch. J., said, "The simple power of the national
legislature is, to prescribe a uniform rule of naturalization, and the exercise of that power
exhausts it, so far as respects the individual." Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 738, 827 (1824).
14. Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915).
15. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
16. See Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491 (1950). A native American was
found to have expatriated herself by voluntarily taking an oath of allegiance to the King
of Italy. Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915) held that denationalization imposed
during the period of coverture on a woman who married a foreigner was "a condition
voluntarily entered into with notice of the consequences." In Lapides v. Clark, 176 F.2d
619 (D.D.C. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949) a naturalized citizen who volun-
tarily resided abroad for thirteen years was said to concur in the loss of his nationality.
17. See note 16 supra.
18. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958) (semble).
19. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) held that denationalization for desertion
from the armed forces as provided for by 66 Stat. 267 (1952), as amended, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1481(a) (8) (1958) was a cruel and unusual punishment, violative of the eighth amend-
ment of the Constitution. But Brennan, J., pointed out that there was not the requisite
rational relation between denationalization for deserting the military and the power of
Congress to raise an army and wage war. 356 U.S. at 114 (concurring opinion).
20. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) held invalid 66 Stat. 267
(1952), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (10) (1958) which purported to deprive an
American of his nationality for remaining outside the jurisdiction of the United States
in time of war to avoid the draft.
21. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
22. E.g., Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9 (1913) (dictum). Although dealing with
the process by which one becomes a citizen of the United States, the court pointed out
that "a naturalized citizen stands on equal footing with the native citizen in all respects,
save that of eligibility to the Presidency." Id. at 22. See Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94
(1884) ; Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 827 (1824).
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that all citizens be treated in the same way.23 To incur condemnation by the
fifth amendment, the legislative classification must be arbitrary and unreason-
ably discriminatory.
2 4
In the present case the court found a rational basis in history and experi-
ence for the distinction between native and adopted citizens noting "that the
problem of naturalized citizens residing at length in the country of their origin
has far greater potential for causing international problems than foreign resi-
dence by citizens under other circumstances.1 25 The court concluded that the
enactment was reasonably related to the avoidance of embarrassment in foreign
affairs, since it dealt with naturalized citizens "as the principal source of the
problem of maintaining international relations in the face of demands for pro-
tection and other relief."
26
A native American may reside abroad indefinitely without loss of citizen-
ship. A naturalized American may not. A native American residing abroad
who proves extremely embarrassing to our Government may not be deprived
of his citizenship. Residence abroad by a naturalized citizen for a period
longer than that specified by law terminates citizenship even if the naturalized
citizen has not caused the slightest embarrassment to our Government. The
result is harsh. Is the reasoning sound? Is there any real difference in the
effect of foreign residence by naturalized citizens in comparison with native
Americans on the conduct of foreign affairs? If a "far greater potential" of
naturalized citizens to cause international problems exists, it lies not in the
fact that these persons as a class conduct themselves while abroad in some
manner less proper than native-born citizens, but that naturalized citizens
residing abroad, particularly those residing in the countries of their origin,
may be more easily woven into the native fabric than other American citizens.
Consequently, when a demand is made for the protection of our Government,
the State Department may have greater difficulty in ascertaining whether a
naturalized citizen has transferred his allegiance than whether a native-born
citizen has. The relation of naturalized citizens to the conduct of foreign affairs
is, at most, indirect; the problem of identification as a citizen may, but does
not necessarily, arise when a naturalized citizen residing abroad seeks the
23. AFL-CIO v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961) held that a summary dismissal of
a concessionaire cook at a Government gun factory for security reasons did not violate
due process. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) allowed native-born citizens
to be classified on the basis of ancestry in upholding an executive order excluding certain
classes of persons from military installations during World War II. Hirabashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) allowed the imposition of a curfew on citizens of Japanese
ancestry.
24. Cf. Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939) (tobacco inspection restricted to
certain areas) ; Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) ; Nebbia v. New
York, 291 U.S. 502 (1933) (milk price control).
25. 218 F. Supp. at 313.
26. Ibid.
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protection of our Government. The power to expatriate naturalized citizens
for foreign residence bears only a tenuous relation to the conduct of foreign
affairs. By denationalizing only naturalized citizens for foreign residence, the
law imposes an inequality of treatment out of proportion to the purpose for
which the classification is made.
JOSEPH J. DVORAK*
* Student, Seton Hall University School of Law.
